Activity Modalities: A Priori Categories of Coordination

Fig. 1

An example of conceptualizing the brain – environment relation (Adapted from [2])

The brain is modeled in an elaborate way, while the environment is simply described as the “world”. Thus, it is recognized that neural representations are influenced by the external world, but the character of these representations is not problematized. Also, influences in the opposite direction – from neural representations to the “world” – are not considered.

In a similar vein, “external” sciences such as organizational science, social sciences, information system development, system engineering, project management, etc., tend to regard the individual as a homogeneous ideal type that can be analyzed and manipulated as other, non-human elements. Thus, human abilities and limitations for acting are disregarded, which may have severe consequences for research in areas where humans are relevant. For example, models of organizations are often so complex that they are exceptionally hard to overview, understand and agree upon (see e.g. TOGAF [3]; a framework for developing so called enterprise architectures).

The separation between the internal and external research areas is understandable since research efforts have to be somehow delimited. However, this dichotomy needs to be overcome in order to advance our understanding of coordination. The brain, body and the environment should be seen in a unitary way, as succinctly stated by Llinás [4]:

[The internal functional space that is made up of neurons must represent the properties of the external world – it must somehow be homomorphic with it [4, p. 65]

Concerning coordination, it is reasonable to assume that every healthy human being is born with certain phylogenetically evolved predispositions to coordinate actions in the same sense that we are born with legs for walking. Such predispositions need to be ontogenetically developed by acting in the various situations that the individual encounters during her life-span. These actions are manifested internally as a changed state of mind, and externally as various means enabling the actions. For example, the ability to orientate oneself in space is certainly alleviated by a map, once the significance of it has been understood by the individual.

The purpose of this contribution is to suggest that the homomorphy between the internal and external worlds can be conceptualized as activity modalities. These modalities – objectivation, contextualization, spatialization, temporalization, stabilization, and transition – should be conceived as a-priori forms, i.e. exigencies for coordinating actions in the same vein that Kant suggested time and space as a-priori forms for knowledge. Thus, the modalities are not something that can be experienced or sensed in the external world. Rather, they are evolutionary developed categories by which our brains are equipped for enabling action. The gist of this position is that sensations in various sensory modalities are integrated by our brain into a coherent, actionable percept structured by the activity modalities and their interdependencies.

The activity modality construct was conceived in my work with the coordination of extremely complex development projects in the telecommunication industry [5]. Gradually, after many years, external manifestations such as information models (spatialization), process models (temporalization), business rules (stabilization), as well as other organizational artifacts, were elaborated into the activity modality construct as putative, general categories of coordination.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, I illustrate the activity modalities by the activity of ancient time mammoth hunting. Next, in order to provide a “foothold” from the external world into the intricacies of the inner world, I suggest modeling the brain as dependencies between capabilities. This approach is inspired from efficacious attempts to capture the essentials of complex systems in the telecom industry [6]. The paper is concluded with a discussion of the implications of the activity modality approach. In conclusion, I suggest that this line of thinking is promising enough for motivating further research efforts along this path.

2 The Activity Modalities

Imagine that you can travel some 30,000 years back in time, and you are one of the hunters in Fig. 2, motivated by the need to get food, acquire material for clothing, making arrowheads, and the like. What coordinative capabilities must you have in order to participate in this activity?¹

Fig. 2

Illustration of an activity (Original wood engraving by Bayard [8])

A basic ability is that you can direct your attention to the object in focus for the activity – the mammoth. If you are unable to recognize the very target that your actions are meant to affect, you cannot coordinate your actions with the other hunters.

Second, given the object and the motive for acting, you need to conceive of a context – a center of gravity so to say – that enables you to recognize that which is relevant to the activity (and disregarding irrelevant things): hunters, bows, arrows, actions, shouts, gestures, and so on. For example, the river in the background is certainly relevant, since it is obstructs the mammoth from escaping in that direction. On the other hand, from participating in fishing activities you know that there are fishes in the river; but these are surely irrelevant in the mammoth hunting activity.

The context is fundamental for making sense of individual actions. For example, it can be seen in the background of Fig. 2 that beaters scare the pray away by means of making noises and a lit fire. These actions would appear completely counterproductive if seen in isolation. It is only in the context of the entire activity that the beaters’ actions become intelligible.

Third, a sense of the spatial structure of the activity needs to be developed in your mind. This enables you to recognize how the relevant things are related to each other, and what properties you confer upon them.

Fourth, you must acquire a sense for the temporal or dynamic structure of the activity. Your actions must be carried out in a certain order. For example, shooting an arrow involves the steps of grasping the arrow, placing it on the bow, stretching the bow, aiming at the target, and releasing the arrow.

Fifth, you cannot shoot your arrows in any way you like. If shooting in a wrong direction, other hunters may be hit rather than the mammoth. You need to know where to aim in order to hurt the mammoth the most. An understanding of how to perform appropriate mammoth hunting will be accrued after many successful (and, presumably, some less successful) mammoth hunts. Eventually, this lends a sense of stability to the activity; of the “taking for granted”; rules and norms indicating proper patterns of action that need not be questioned as long as they work.

Sixth, an activity is typically related to other activities. For example, the prey will most likely be cut into pieces and prepared to eat. This is done in a cooking activity, which in turn has its particular motive – to still hunger – and object, which happens to be the same as for the hunting activity: the mammoth. However, in this context, other aspects of the mammoth are relevant (as, for example what parts of the mammoth are edible). In order to participate in or conceive of other activities, you must be capable of refocusing your attention; to make a transition from one activity to another.

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