Developmental psychopathology and classification in childhood and adolescence
Stephen Scott
Introduction
Classification schemes of psychiatric disorders in childhood and adolescence have to take into account three particular features. Firstly, the individual is continually changing and growing. Sound knowledge is therefore required of the normal range of development and its limits. For example, some fears may be normal in a 5-year-old but abnormal in an 8-year-old. Once identified, it is helpful to decide if abnormalities are due to delay in or deviance from the usual pattern of development. The implications of each differ, and should be classified differently. Secondly, the majority of childhood mental health problems arise from an excess of behaviours exhibited by many young people, such as aggression or dieting. They are seldom due to qualitatively distinct phenomena of the kind more often seen in adult conditions, such as hearing voices or hanging oneself. Consequently choosing a cut-off point to make a categorical entity from a dimensional construct is more often used in child psychiatry. This is inevitably an arbitrary process (albeit informed by empirical criteria), which may lead to loss of information, and may be held to be labelling the child unnecessarily. That dimensions can be interchanged with categories does not necessarily mean they are unhelpful—after all, day and night are useful terms yet the boundary between them is continuous and arbitrary. Psychiatrists in particular may be criticized for ‘medicalizing’ a child’s difficulties by talking about disorders or diagnoses, whereas other professionals and parents may prefer to see them as understandable variations in child development, and prefer to call them ‘emotional and behavioural difficulties’. However, diagnoses are a quick way to convey a lot of information that dimensions may not. Thus to only say a child is at an extreme of an antisocial behaviour dimension does not necessarily convey the association with specific reading retardation and ADHD, which could be (and often are) consequently missed.
Thirdly, children’s difficulties nearly always arise in the context of relationships within the family. More often than in adulthood, some or all, of the problem may appear to be the result of the functioning of the family, rather than in the individual child who may merely be reacting to the situation. For example, a child who is disobedient and shouts in class may simply be behaving the way his parents do at home. A classification system will be stronger if it can take family functioning into account—it will have a greater chance of capturing clinically important causal and therapeutic considerations.
A valid and useful classification system will need to take into account these features and be based on a thorough understanding of normal development and how it can go wrong, rather than merely include static descriptions of presumed pathological states. The term of developmental psychopathology was coined in the early 1980s to denote the scientific study of how abnormalities can be understood in terms of processes underpinning human development.(1,2) There are now journals and books incorporating the term into their titles.(3,4) Many disciplines are relevant, from embryology and genetics to social learning theory and criminology. Developmental psychopathology, besides studying the impact of pathogenic influences on pathways through life, such as the way the
monoamine oxidase-A (MAOA) genotype interacts with an abusive upbringing to cause conduct disorder,(5) or how specific reading retardation leads to low self-esteem, also investigates protective mechanisms, such as the ameliorating effect of high IQ on the propensity to juvenile offending, or the beneficial effect of a trusting and caring relationship with an adult on the impact of childhood abuse. This chapter aims to show how findings from developmental psychopathology have informed current classification systems, and what challenges remain.
monoamine oxidase-A (MAOA) genotype interacts with an abusive upbringing to cause conduct disorder,(5) or how specific reading retardation leads to low self-esteem, also investigates protective mechanisms, such as the ameliorating effect of high IQ on the propensity to juvenile offending, or the beneficial effect of a trusting and caring relationship with an adult on the impact of childhood abuse. This chapter aims to show how findings from developmental psychopathology have informed current classification systems, and what challenges remain.
General issues
Change over time
Because mental processes and behaviour change as a child develops, it is not always clear whether the same diagnoses should be applied across the age range. Thus a highly aggressive toddler may throw himself screaming onto the floor in daily tantrums, whereas a highly aggressive teenager may assault old ladies and rob them. Do they suffer from the same disorder? ICD 10 holds that they do— both meet criteria for conduct disorder, which is defined in terms of antisocial behaviour that is excessive for the individual’s age, and that violates societal norms and the rights of others. DSM IV-R on the other hand has two separate diagnoses, oppositional-defiant disorder for the younger case, and conduct disorder for the older. However, as both diagnoses have similar correlates and there is a strong continuity from one to the other, the validity of the division is questionable. Yet current adult psychiatric schemes have no diagnosis at all to apply to antisocial behaviour, unless it is part of a personality disorder.
The extent to which adult criteria should be applied to children requires good empirical data. In the case of obsessive-compulsive disorder, the phenomenology is remarkably similar in childhood, so there is no problem. However, for depression the picture is rather different. Currently, ICD 10 and DSM IV-R have few emotional disorder categories specific to childhood, and they are mostly subtypes of anxiety. Mood disorders are diagnosed according to adult criteria, with the consequence that surveys of depression find prevalence rates close to zero under 8 years of age. Yet there are miserable children who cry frequently, say they are unhappy, look sad, and are withdrawn.(6) However, they usually sleep and eat reasonably well, and their mood fluctuates during the day, with spells when they sometimes appear more cheerful. Should they not be allowed a diagnosis? ICD 9 had a category for ‘disturbance of emotions specific to childhood and adolescence, with misery and unhappiness’, and such children suffer impairment.(7) Follow-up studies of prepubertal children referred with this picture showed a moderately increased risk of adult type depression later on, whereas adolescents with depressive symptoms had a higher risk of adult depression.(8) Genetic studies show that symptoms of depression in prepubertal children are predominantly due to environmental influences, whereas after puberty genetic influences become more important.(9) Finally, tricyclics are not effective in childhood but are effective in adults. This example shows that misery in younger children has some phenomenological features and external correlates in common with adult depression but also several differences, so the current approach which makes a comprehensive yet parsimonious classification system for all ages loses validity.
In contrast, there is continuing reluctance to diagnose personality disorders in childhood. This may be because they are often seen as a life sentence of a noxious, untreatable condition, in distinction to the general hope that there is opportunity for ‘growing out of’ conditions in childhood, or treatment for them. However, with perhaps the most destructive personality type, dissocial, there is growing evidence that the combination of antisocial behaviour and callous-unemotional traits is well established by the age of seven. Moreover, this combination of childhood characteristics has a far higher heritability than antisocial behaviour without callous-unemotional traits.(10)
Validity
Categories need to be distinct not only in terms of the phenomena used to define them, but, crucially, also in terms of external criteria. Even if categories can be reliably distinguished, if external criteria are the same, then one is likely to be dealing with two variants of the same condition. An analogy would be the difference between black and white cats.
Typical validating criteria in child psychiatry derived from developmental psychopathology are:
1 Epidemiological data, such as age of onset and sex ratio. Forty years ago ‘childhood psychosis’ was a unitary classification, but work showing the clear difference in age of onset helped validate the distinction between autism and schizophrenia, which seldom co-occur. Disruptive disorders occur four times more commonly in boys, whereas emotional disorders are commoner in girls.
2 Long-term course. Most childhood disorders show reasonable homotypic continuity, that is they stay the same. Some show heterotypic continuity, so that for example, some cases of childhood hyperactivity end up as antisocial adults. This does not necessarily invalidate the category, but requires explanation.
3 Genetic findings. If individuals with distinct categorical diagnoses have relatives with different disorders, this helps validate the distinction. This has confirmed the validity of several diagnostic categories, but not all. For example, it has not held for the many specific subtypes of anxiety disorder in ICD 10, whose validity is questionable. Genetic studies can also clarify the scope of symptom clusters. For example, family studies of autism have revealed a broader phenotype in relatives of probands,(11) so that new disorders may need to be considered, which encompass only one of the original three constituent domains of classical autism, namely social relatedness, communication problems, and repetitive and stereotyped behaviours.
The hunt is now on for specific genes associated with particular psychiatric disorders. Thus dopamine receptor and transporter genes are reliably associated with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder,(12) but unless (i) the gene always leads to the disorder and (ii) all cases of the disorder are caused by the gene, particular genotypes are unlikely to be used to validate diagnostic categories.
4 Psychosocial risk factors. The association between institutional upbringing with many changes of carer and reactive attachment disorder is so strong that it has been made a requirement for diagnosis in ICD 10. Conduct disorders are strongly associated with discords at home, whereas autistic disorders are not. However, most psychosocial risk factors are less specific in their associations, and so are only modestly helpful as validating criteria.
5 Neuropsychological tests. The hyperkinetic syndrome is clearly distinguishable from conduct disorder on tests of attention such
as the continuous performance task. Recently, there has been considerable progress in showing that one of the core deficits in autism is failure on ‘theory of mind’ tests of ability, to see another person’s point of view, which non-autistic children, with comparable levels of intellectual disability, can do.
6 Medical investigations. There have been many failed attempts in this field, including biochemical markers of adolescent depression and endocrine markers of aggression. However, the advent of functional neuroimaging is allowing exciting relatively non-invasive pictures of children’s brains to be built up, and reliable findings are beginning to emerge, for example in ADHD.(13) In future these may well be helpful validators for classification.
Reliability
This is a prerequisite for validity, and most categories have reasonable inter-rater and test-retest values, once investigators are trained up. Where there are many overlapping categories, as in current definitions of the many varieties of anxiety disorders, or personality disorders, inter-rater reliability falls.(14)
Effect of informant and instrument
Traditionally information is obtained from parents and the child, and is then combined by the clinician on a case-by-case basis. However, the need for consistent diagnostic rules that is imposed by a ‘menu-driven’ approach can prove difficult, since the weight given to a particular informant may best vary according to condition. Thus, if a parent says a child has symptoms of conduct disorder but the child denies it, the parent is more likely to be right and the child may be covering up or ashamed. However, if the parent says the child is not depressed but the mental state examination of the child reveals otherwise, it is the parent who may be ignorant of their child’s true state. Such difficulties reduce the validity of interviews which use invariant combination rules. Further, in genetic studies, the heritability of a condition may vary greatly according to which informant is believed. Thus in the Virginia Twin study, conduct disorder was 69 per cent heritable according to the information derived from the mother interview, 36 per cent using information from the child, and only 27 per cent using information from the father.(15) Studies such as these underline the need for clinically sensitive ways of combining information, and the use of multiinformant, multi-method ascertainment of information. Statistical techniques such as latent variable analysis may help reduce measurement error, but may build in unwarranted assumptions which distort the raw data.
Structured interviews, which accept the respondent’s reply, do not require lengthy training or clinically informed investigators, and so are popular in epidemiological surveys. However, the quality of information differs little from that obtained by questionnaire,(16) and often has a high false-positive and false-negative rate in comparison to semi-structured interviews. Direct observation, although expensive, often provides the most reliable and valid information for assessment of disruptive disorders.

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