Forced Normalization: Value and Limitations of the Concept
Michael Trimble
Kimford J. Meador
An association between epilepsy and psychosis has been noted since the nineteenth century (1), but the mechanisms underlying this association are still poorly understood. Certain aspects of this relationship are controversial and several factors contribute to this controversy (2). Both epilepsy and psychosis are heterogeneous disorders. The definitions of psychosis and the clinical classification of epilepsy-related psychosis into ictal, postictal, and interictal psychosis are not related to distinct pathophysiologies and similarities between abnormal behaviors in temporal lobe epilepsy, and psychiatric disorders do not necessarily imply similar mechanisms. Finally, both “affinity” and “antagonism” hypotheses have been postulated for the association between epilepsy and psychosis (2). The “affinity” hypothesis is supported by observations of an increased incidence of psychoses in people with epilepsy, especially with temporal lobe epilepsy, and the occurrence of psychosis in the ictal and postictal periods. The “antagonism” hypothesis is supported by some epidemiological observations that seizures were observed infrequently in some psychiatric populations, and that epilepsy seemed to have a better prognosis in the presence of psychosis. These observations, and the observations on certain psychotic patients whose psychosis remitted after a seizure, led (3) to the introduction of convulsive therapy for the treatment of schizophrenia (3). However, any comprehensive explanation of the relation between epilepsy and psychosis must explain the paradox that features of both affinity and antagonism can occur.
In the mid-twentieth century, Heirich Landolt discussed the relationship between epilepsy, electroencephalogram (EEG) findings, and psychosis, in a series of papers (4,5,6). He described four situations in which the EEG elucidated the nature of the psychosis, including postparoxysmal twilight states (i.e., postictal deliria and psychoses), petit mal of Lennox (i.e., nonconvulsive status), psycho-organic episodes, and productive psychotic episodes associated with forced normalization of the EEG. Landolt defined the latter as follows: “Forced normalization is the
phenomenon characterized by the fact that, with the occurrence of psychotic states, the EEG becomes more normal or entirely normal as compared with previous and subsequent EEG findings.” Later, Hubert Tellenbach introduced the term “alternative psychosis” to denote episodes of brief psychosis during periods of seizure resolution that alternated with periods of increased seizure activity but normal behavior suggesting that the seizures and psychosis appear antagonistic (7). Alternative psychosis is now taken to be the clinical counterpoint of forced normalization and differs in that alternative psychosis is based on clinical features only and EEG is not required to define the state. Both forced normalization and alternating psychosis have been reported subsequently by several authors (8,9,10,11,12,13).
phenomenon characterized by the fact that, with the occurrence of psychotic states, the EEG becomes more normal or entirely normal as compared with previous and subsequent EEG findings.” Later, Hubert Tellenbach introduced the term “alternative psychosis” to denote episodes of brief psychosis during periods of seizure resolution that alternated with periods of increased seizure activity but normal behavior suggesting that the seizures and psychosis appear antagonistic (7). Alternative psychosis is now taken to be the clinical counterpoint of forced normalization and differs in that alternative psychosis is based on clinical features only and EEG is not required to define the state. Both forced normalization and alternating psychosis have been reported subsequently by several authors (8,9,10,11,12,13).
Value of the Concept
The question as to the validity of the concept has been explored in the book by Trimble and Schmitz (14), where translations of the original papers from Landolt and Tellenbach are given, with contemporary observations from several investigators. The observations of Landolt were largely ignored by several generations of neurologists, for two main reasons. First, he published mainly in German, and second it brought neurology uncomfortably close to psychiatry. The idea that suppression of seizures could be harmful to patients was a complete anathema to many who were of the view (correctly) that the first and main aim of the treatment of epilepsy must be to control seizures, and that (incorrectly) the brain was some kind of static machinery that yielded its secrets to the pathologist’s knife. The observations were made at an historical time of perhaps the greatest division of the two specialties (neurology and psychiatry) and before a distinct breed of specialists emerged with a special interest in epilepsy—epileptologists. Further, the number of drugs available for the treatment of the condition were distinctly limited.
Landolt’s contribution raised many important issues that are still germane today. Seizures are not the same as epilepsy, and the two are frequently confused. Seizures are but one manifestation of an underlying disease process, the latter being present well before and after the seizure has been expressed clinically. The underlying dysfunction, continuing in time, has other effects, many more subtle than the seizures, but nonetheless important clinically. Cognitive dysfunction is but one possibility, with psychosis being another possibility. Landolt and Tellenbach pointed out how the underlying epilepsy in many of their cases was “psychomotor,” implying a temporal lobe pathology underlying the seizures. At this time the concept of the limbic system and its anatomical connections and relationship to the control of emotional behavior was barely on the horizon, and the ideas of neurotransmission were in their infancy. However, the observation that suppression of seizures of a temporal lobe origin could lead to an alternative clinical expression has been but one of the pieces of the jigsaw of unraveling the role of the limbic lobe of the brain in the regulation of behavior. The concept did indeed bring psychiatry close to epileptology. Electroconvulsive therapy emerged as an effective treatment for severe psychiatric disorders, some behavior disorders associated with epilepsy had a sounder neuroanatomical/neurophysiological basis and could be acknowledged clinically, and some of the earlier paradoxes were resolved. As Wolf and Trimble (10) noted, the antagonism was not between epilepsy and schizophrenia, but between seizures and the symptoms and signs of psychotic states. In other words, within the increased association between epilepsy and psychoses was an antagonism between seizures and hallucinations and delusions. In chronic cases this emerged when the pattern of the seizures changed in the longitudinal course of epilepsy, with
seizure diminishing and the psychotic symptoms emerging. However, acutely this could be revealed through states of forced normalization.
seizure diminishing and the psychotic symptoms emerging. However, acutely this could be revealed through states of forced normalization.
The original observations of Landolt were made when patients were given ethosuximide, then a new antiepileptic drug (AED). Patients became seizure-free, and in some the psychosis erupted. This potential, for the sudden transformation of an aberrant cerebral process from one state to another, helps explain a mutability of the clinical picture. The latter then is understood as being based on changing the underlying neurophysiological/neurochemical status of the brain, brought about by artificially altering the neuromodulators within the brain, more specifically by the enhancement of inhibitory factors. This makes heuristic sense, if the brain is viewed as a dynamic but self-contained energy system; sudden change does not allow for the resetting of a previously established homeostasis. Landolt referred to his phenomenon as based upon a “supranormal” inhibitory process, but he could not, in the absence of the neurochemical understanding that we now have, take this any further.
Stevens (15) has put forward the view that “all that spikes are not fits,” and that inhibition by dopamine, γ-aminobutyric acid (GABA), and other transmitters is essential to prevent the normal brain from being in a continual state of status. In her model, however, excess inhibition predisposes to psychosis (e.g., dopamine agonism being psychotogenic), the alternative to this being the stunning effect of clozapine, the antipsychotic drug most likely to provoke seizures, in intractable cases of psychosis. These observations and theories, derived from psychiatry and neurology, have not only enhanced our understanding of the basic mechanisms of the psychosis, but have also allowed us to understand some of the behavior consequences of prescription of AEDs better. Psychosis and depression are the most frequently noted behavioral effects, and are commonly the reason to stop such drugs. In many cases this occurs in the setting of seizure resolution, and if EEG is performed, in the presence of normalization (16). Although examples of the latter may be seen with most of the AEDs, those which are GABAergic seem the most relevant, again enhancing our understanding of the neurochemical basis of behavior, and leading to caution in the clinical use of such drugs in certain populations (17).

Stay updated, free articles. Join our Telegram channel

Full access? Get Clinical Tree

