Legal Issues
The interface between psychiatry and law is in flux, partly because of recent patient’s rights legislation (based on the constitutional assurance that no person shall be deprived of his or her liberty without “due process of law”) (1,2). A psychiatrist’s dealings with his patients increasingly are constrained by case law and statue. It is essential to learn the limits of your independence in relation to your patients. Laws can differ markedly from state to state and may change with time—become familiar with those laws that apply to your area.
CIVIL LAW
Civil Commitment
All states permit civil commitment to inpatient [and, at times, outpatient (3)] psychiatric care under specific, but differing, criteria. Know your local standards.
Mental Illness: All states require the presence of a mental illness, but definitions differ. Psychosis usually is included, but personality disorder is not. Drug or alcohol abuse or both may be allowed. Mental illness alone is not sufficient for commitment but requires at least one of the following two additional conditions.
Dangerousness: To self or others: Most states require that the patient be dangerous but differ in the degree of urgency—an imminent danger (e.g., likely to hurt himself in the next 24 hours) versus a relative danger (e.g., physically deteriorating through depressive withdrawal). Dangerousness is the most common reason for commitment in most states. Two major problems with the dangerousness standard are (a) psychiatrists have difficulty accurately predicting future dangerous behavior except in the most obvious cases; and (b) it has been uncertain what level of proof the law requires—states vary widely, from the lowest civil standard of “preponderance of the evidence” (51% certainty) to the most strict criminal standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt”
(95% certainty). This latter issue appears to have been resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court decision (Addington v Texas, 1979) causing Federal courts to favor “clear and convincing evidence” (75% certainty).
Disabled and in need of treatment: Although diminished in degree, most states allow commitment solely on the grounds that a person is significantly handicapped by a mental illness, is unable to provide for his own basic needs (the parens patriae provision), and is in need of, and would benefit from, treatment. This is qualified in many states by a requirement proceeding from Lake v Cameron (1966) that hospitalization be the “least restrictive” of the treatment options available.
Some states now allow commitment of the developmentally disabled, substance users, and mentally disabled minors. Special due-process provisions apply.
Most states also have laws (usually less strict) allowing brief (1 to 14 days) involuntary holds. A growing tendency in the law exists toward “a duty to commit” worrisome patients (Schuster v Altenberg, 1988). Committed patients who believe they are being held illegally may obtain a hearing by a writ of habeas corpus.
Much recent legislation defining these standards has redressed real past wrongs that occurred when commitment could result merely from a physician’s “okay,” yet recent controversy has focused on associated losses to the patient and his or her family due to exclusion from treatment because of complex criminal-like commitment proceedings. As fewer patients have been treated involuntarily, some experts have noted a shift of mental patients from the civil to the criminal system (i.e., untreated mental illness causes them to break a law they ordinarily would not have broken, and they are then arrested). The extent of this trend remains undetermined.
An additional impact of the changing commitment laws has been to require the release of committed patients much earlier than in the past, resulting in a marked decline in the size of state mental hospitals. An unfortunate effect of this deinstitutionalization has been to release large numbers of marginally functional persons into communities ill equipped to deal with them, with the resultant formation of “psychiatric ghettos” in some large cities.
The Right to Treatment
After the classic Alabama decision of Wyatt v Stickney (1972), it has become a general standard (amazingly, it had not been before) that an involuntarily committed person must receive a level of
effective treatment adequate to encourage improvement. This concept was challenged, reviewed, and supported in Youngberg v Romeo (1982). How to deal with the patient who is unlikely to improve with any treatment remains uncertain.
effective treatment adequate to encourage improvement. This concept was challenged, reviewed, and supported in Youngberg v Romeo (1982). How to deal with the patient who is unlikely to improve with any treatment remains uncertain.

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