When reviewing psychoanalytical literature regarding the Self, there is a degree of confusion about the term. Different authors utilize the same terms in order to indicate different realities. The concept of “I” overlaps with that of the Self, or with that of the “ego,” or even with that of the person. The peculiar translation by Strachey does not help in this process, taking the German “Ich,” seemingly under pressure from Ernest Jones, and instead of changing it to the English “I,” as in other languages, ended up transforming it into the peculiar “ego,” which has had so much success in Anglo-Saxon psychoanalytical literature and even in international popular literature. Even Freud utilizes the term “ego” (Ich) in two ways: to refer to a part of the psychic apparatus in his structural theory of the mind, and also in order to indicate the entire person, or Self. This equivalence between the person and the Self continues to this day, from authors such as Meissner [8], a true exegete of the work of Freud, reaching levels of analysis of extreme complexity.

Meissner [8] points out some fundamental characteristics of the Self, especially in its role as generator of structure.

We can see that the concept of Self varies according to various schools of thought and authors. We observe two fundamental ways in which the Self can be conceived. One is as a substructure, considering the Self as being equivalent to the I, or rather, taking the Self as a structure of a greater entity that contains within itself all of the parts of the psychic apparatus. In this sense, the concept of the Self runs parallel to that of the I in the work of Freud, which alternates between the two uses described. On the other hand, there is a different usage, which we consider to be greater today. This would be the use of the Self as representation, equivalent to the global person, especially in the context of object relations. This is the more standard use in contemporary psychoanalytical literature. Applebaum [9] considers the structure to be composed of “stable configurations of the Self and the object,” thus developing the classic formulations of Kernberg [10].

In summation, we should say that in this text we consider the Self to be equivalent to the global person, following the extensive use of the concept indicated in the work of Meissner [8], as well as many other authors. To that end, the idea of the identity of the Self (self-identity), in our case, reflects the very conception of our person in the most global sense, including one’s generic identity, with all of the subtleties that we describe below.

We should also indicate that the confluence of the concepts of self-identity and gender lead us to different analyses. One is the examination of the process of acquisition of gender identity and of gender role identity. The other is a reflection regarding the different factors that affect the construction of self-identity in men and women. We will touch upon the first topic and concentrate more on the second, which, to our understanding, has not been sufficiently dealt with in the literature, and is of great interest.

What are we talking about, in natural terms, when we refer to gender identity?

Within this conceptual variety, two elements occupy a preferential position [11]. They are core gender identity, based on biological and constitutional aspects, and gender role identity, built on a foundation of social and collective provisions. We direct our reflections here toward those points in particular.

The concept of bisexuality in Freud occupies a very central position in his thoughts regarding human sexual development. The social and academic attitude toward this proposal has gone back and forth throughout the years. Often. it has even been vehemently rejected. Nowadays, it has been accepted once again, in line with the increased attention currently paid to the very early relationship with parental figures, especially the mother. The processes of identification and fusion with the mother are today considered key to generic identity formation, which for Stoller [12, 13] is firmly established before the age of 2 years, before any type of Oedipal eventuality. Authors such as Benjamin [14] draw attention to the limitations of the classic Freudian theory on the subject and propose a more integrated vision of the processes that constitute gender. For this author, the boy and girl want what they don’t have, in addition to what they have, not instead of what they have. Logically, from this point of reflection, the classic lines of thinking regarding “fault,” “injury,” “envy,” or even “castration,” acquire different nuances.

Some people, including some researchers, are uncomfortable with this complex reality and even reject it. It is certain that a good part of the population, possibly the majority of the population, displays a consistency between inner life, social role, desire, and partner choice, but undoubtedly there is another group, perhaps larger than we believe, that does not comply with this generality. For a while now, homosexual men and women have also been becoming a field of study and every day we know more about their lives and their internal world as well as their relationships. However, we still know little about those who do not fall under that narrow definition of homosexuality. Those who show orientation or identities that are more complex tend to be considered outliers in the world of science and academia, set apart from normal studies. The result is a general loss. A loss, perhaps, for these people, who could see themselves being more integrated into the social norms in which they live, and without question a loss for us, since the study of different lives can enormously enrich our comprehension of key phenomena such as identity, sexuality, and gender.

Without question, the study of “different” sexualities and their construction is perceived as a danger within society in general. Sexuality, understood in the broader sense of Stoller [15] as that which has to do with gender identity and desire, is a fundamental pillar of individual and collective identity. To establish other possible sexual identities would provoke a furious reaction in some and a more discreet rejection from almost everyone else. There is something intimate that breaks when we are faced with things that might be different, that we might desire other people or feel differently. It seems like the acquisition of this generic identity, especially the masculine identity, is a laborious and fragile process that we should take care of and protect. The conduct of these extreme minorities that go from rejection to frank aggression to those who are different show a major trace of tendencies and movements that affect society as a whole. Some turn their attention toward the social–political background of the gender roles, and the unequal distribution of power that they entail, considering social forces, expressed through certain individual attitudes, as the ultimate cause of the anxiety that is felt in the face of the possibility of there being differences. In our opinion, the anxiety has a deeper origin. Damasio [16] describes the so-called extended Self, which originates in the autobiographical conscience and thus comes from that identity continuity through time: I am who I was yesterday and who I was before then. We should say that gender identity and the disposition of our desire constitute aspects that are absolutely nuclear within this extended Self. When the final certainties relating to gender are called into question, panic comes to the fore.

The situation regarding sexuality in contemporary psychoanalytical theory deserves reflection, even if it is brief. We should say that the central position that sexuality occupied within the origins of psychoanalysis has changed greatly. Amazingly, in spite of the growing attention that biological matters are awakening in many neighboring disciplines such as cognitive theory, psychoanalysis has moved away from what were its first signs of identity. The relational perspective, already present in the works of Erikson [17], more intensely in the contributions of Klein et al. [18] and followers, and today more so in the relational theories of Mitchell [19], has in a way desexualized the sexual encounter to the point of considering it simply a variation of the way in which humans connect with each other. Nonetheless, as Fonagy indicates in a review [20], the reality around us, which shows us the constant presence of sexual inhibitions and lack of satisfaction, conflicts, and perversions, the tremendous intensity of guilt, jealousy, and rage that are involved in sexuality, still remind us the central role of sexual function. Possibly Kernberg [21], with his more integrated model that assigns a greater role to drives, is one of the few contemporary theorists, together with Laplanche [22], who continue to consider sexuality to be central to the internal world and to human behavior.

Nancy Chodorow [23] warns us of the necessity of valuing sexuality in an individual manner and of avoiding empty generalizations. She criticizes over-generalization, universalism, and essentialism and advocates consideration of the individual route, which each subject goes through, and of the thousand different ways of creating global and gender identity. She indicates to us, referring to the woman: “It is apparent that gender, like selfhood, must be individually unique…There are many psychologies of women. Each woman creates her own psychological gender through emotionally and conflictually charged unconscious fantasies that help construct her inner world, that projectively imbue cultural conceptions, and that interpret her sexual anatomy. By making some unconscious fantasies and interpretations more salient than others, each woman creates her own prevalent animation of gender.” It is difficult to synthesize the description of such a complex process any better. It might be possible to extend this reflection to men as well.