vs. Strong Quantum Cognition




© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
Hans Liljenström (ed.)Advances in Cognitive Neurodynamics (IV)Advances in Cognitive Neurodynamics10.1007/978-94-017-9548-7_58


Weak vs. Strong Quantum Cognition



Paavo Pylkkänen1, 2  


(1)
Department of Cognitive Neuroscience and Philosophy, University of Skövde, 408, SE-541 28 Skövde, Sweden

(2)
The Finnish Center of Excellence in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (TINT), Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art Studies, University of Helsinki, 24, FI-00014 Helsinki, Finland

 



 

Paavo Pylkkänen



Abstract

In recent decades some cognitive scientists have adopted a program of quantum cognition. For example, Pothos and Busemeyer (PB) argue that there are empirical results concerning human decision-making and judgment that can be elegantly accounted for by quantum probability (QP) theory, while classical (Bayesian) probability theory fails. They suggest that the reason why QP works better is because some cognitive phenomena are analogous to quantum phenomena. This naturally gives rise to a further question about why they are analogous. Is this a pure coincidence, or is there a deeper reason? For example, could the neural processes underlying cognition involve subtle quantum effects, thus explaining why cognition obeys QP? PB are agnostic about this controversial issue, and thus their kind of program could be labeled as “weak quantum cognition” (analogously to the program of weak artificial intelligence as characterized by Searle). However, there is a long tradition of speculating about the role of subtle quantum effects in the neural correlates of cognition, constituting a program of “strong quantum cognition” (SQC) or “quantum cognitive neuroscience”. This paper considers the prospects of SQC, by briefly reviewing and commenting on some of the key proposals. In particular, Bohm and Hiley’s active information program will be discussed.


Keywords
Quantum cognitionQuantum probabilityAnalogyActive informationImplicate orderMental causationRepresentational contentDavid BohmBasil Hiley



1 Introduction


In their recent article “Can quantum probability provide a new direction for cognitive modeling?” Pothos and Busemeyer (PB) (2013) make a convincing case that there are empirical results concerning human decision making and judgment that can be elegantly accounted for by quantum probability (QP) theory, while classical (Bayesian) probability theory fails [15]. In particular, they point out that human judgment and preference often display order and context effects, violations of the law of total probability and failures of compositionality, and that in such cases QP – with features such as superposition and entanglement – provides a natural explanation of cognitive process. More generally, they suggest that QP is potentially relevant in any behavioral situation that involves uncertainty.

Such success in modeling raises the question of how can it be that QP which was developed to account for quantum physical phenomena could possibly be able to account for cognitive phenomena. PB do not discuss this issue at great length, but suggest that the reason is because some cognitive phenomena are analogous to quantum phenomena. But this gives rise to a further question: why are these phenomena analogous to each other? Is it a mere coincidence or is there some deeper explanation? For example, might the neural processes underlying cognition be quantum-like in some way? PB remain agnostic about this controversial issue, and thus we might call their program an instance of “weak quantum cognition” (somewhat analogously to the program of weak AI in artificial intelligence research; cf. also the program of “weak quantum theory”, where one applies some, but not all formal features of quantum theory to explain cognitive phenomena, see Atmaspacher et al. 2002 [3]). However, there is a long tradition of speculating about the role of subtle quantum effects in the neural correlates of cognition, constituting a program of “strong quantum cognition” or “quantum cognitive neuroscience”. While it may be a good research strategy in cognitive science to pursue weak quantum cognition without worrying about the underlying reasons for why QP works for cognition, it would clearly be a major scientific breakthrough if strong quantum cognition would turn out to be correct. It is thus worth giving attention to the current state-of-the-art in strong quantum cognition. The aim of this paper is to briefly review and comment some major developments. In particular, I will consider the prospects of Bohm and Hiley’s research program [8, 18].


2 Strong Quantum Cognition: Subtle Quantum Effects in the Neural Correlates of Cognition?


There are various ways in which the neural processes underlying cognition could be quantum-like. The strongest possibility is that they literally involve subtle quantum effects. For example, following Niels Bohr, David Bohm speculated about this possibility already in 1951 in his textbook Quantum theory [6]. Anticipating the current research on quantum cognition [1, 15], he drew attention to what he considered to be remarkable point-by-point analogies between quantum processes and thought. He added that it would provide a natural explanation of these analogies if it turned out that some key neural processes (e.g. in synapses) were subject to quantum-theoretical limitations (for a discussion of Bohm’s analogies see Pylkkänen 2014 [17]).

Harald Atmanspacher (2011) has provided a useful overview of various programs of what I have above call “strong quantum cognition” [2]. First of all, there are approaches that stay within the usual interpretation of the quantum theory. There is the von Neumann-Wigner line of thought that assumes that consciousness plays a role in quantum state reductions; in Stapp’s later development of this approach the neural correlates of conscious intentional acts are assumed to involve quantum state reductions. There is the Ricciardi-Umezawa-Vitiello approach that sees mental states, particularly memory states, as vacuum states of quantum fields (this approach has been given an imaginative philosophical interpretation by Globus 2003 [10]). Finally, there is the Beck-Eccles approach, where it is assumed that due to quantum mechanical processes the frequency of exocytosis at a synaptic cleft can be controlled by mental intentions, without violating the conservation of energy (for a discussion of this last approach see also Hiley and Pylkkänen 2005 [13]).

Atmanspacher also draws attention to programs of strong quantum cognition that involve further extensions or generalizations of present-day quantum theory. Most notably, there is Penrose’s proposal that human (say mathematical) insight is non-computable and that the physiological correlates of such insight thus need to involve non-computable physical processes. He thinks that such process might well be related to quantum state reduction. However, Penrose is not satisfied with quantum state reduction as this is characterized in the usual interpretation of quantum theory. Instead, he proposes that gravity brings about the reduction under certain circumstances, which allows the possibility of an orchestrated objective reduction (Orch-OR) – the idea being that the reduction can take place without the activity of a human conscious observer, and in an orchestrated way. This involves an extension of current quantum theory, in which latter the state reductions obey the usual laws of quantum probability. Together with Hameroff, Penrose proposed that neural microtubules might provide a site where Orch-ORs could take place. Their assumption is that Orch-ORs in neural microtubules, when suitably integrated, constitute conscious moments. (So it is not that consciousness collapses the wave function but rather that the collapses constitute consciousness.) The idea is similar to Stapp’s later ideas, but one difference is that while Stapp stays within the usual interpretation of quantum theory, Penrose’s approach involves going beyond it (in that the reductions can be objective and orchestrated, and need not obey the usual quantum laws). Hameroff and Penrose (2014) have recently published an extensive review of their approach, with new features and, in the same journal, a reply to various criticisms [12].

Those who advocate strong quantum cognition typically encounter the criticism that quantum effects are washed out in the “warm, wet and noisy” conditions of the macroscopic world and brains in particular (the “decoherence problem”). It is thus concluded that quantum theory is only relevant to physical processes in the (sub)atomic domain and should be ignored in other physical domains. However, there are many recent research developments suggesting that biological organisms at ordinary temperatures exploit subtle quantum effects, and biological evolution would thus have been able to solve the decoherence problem at least in some biological contexts (e.g. the studies on energy-harvesting in photosynthesis and avian magnetoreception; for a short review, see Ball, P. (2011) [4]). As Atmanspacher points out, it is however still a controversial issue whether subtle quantum processes play a significant role in the neural correlates of cognition and consciousness.

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Sep 24, 2016 | Posted by in NEUROLOGY | Comments Off on vs. Strong Quantum Cognition

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