The concept of personality, in my view (Kernberg and Caligor 2005; Posner et al. 2003), refers to the dynamic integration of the totality of a person’s subjective experience and behavior patterns—including both conscious, concrete and habitual behaviors and experiences of self and of the surrounding world; conscious, explicit psychic thinking and habitual desires and fears; unconscious behavior patterns, experiences, and views; and intentional states. Personality is a dynamic integration insofar as it implies an organized, integrated association of multiple traits and experiences that influence one another, the final outcome of the coordination of multiple dispositions. In this regard, it represents a much more complex and sophisticated entity than simply the sum of all its component features. Personality derives from the human organism’s capacity to experience subjective states that reflect the internal condition of the body as well as the perception of the external environment within which this body functions. It includes discrete psychic functions such as affects, perception, cognition, instrumental as well as declarative memory, and various levels of self-reflective functions, from relatively simple mirroring of perceived and intended motor movements and perceived sensory experiences, to complex self-reflective evaluation of cognitive and affective states. The combined scientific advances in genetic determination of neurotransmitters that activate and regulate various affective states, the observation of interacting relationships between baby and caregiver from birth on, and the observation of psychological functioning throughout early development and into adulthood are gradually facilitating an integrated view of the determinants of the personality. The study of brain structures related to affect activation and control, and of instrumental and declarative development of memory and cognitive capacities, combined with the psychodynamic study of the intrapsychic relationship between behaviors, motivational states, fantasy, and perception of psychosocial reality, is providing a broader context for our understanding. The study of the sociology of small groups and the psychological influence of educational and cultural mores, and the study of specific types of organic and personality pathology, jointly permit, I believe, establishment of a general frame of reference for the dominant features of the personality and their harmonious or disharmonious functioning in health and illness. Personality researchers and experts would probably all agree that personality is codetermined by genetic and constitutional dispositions as they interact with the individual’s environment, particularly psychosocial features, during psychological development. Nonetheless, there remain enormous differences among the relevant fields regarding the key determinants of the personality, their mutual influences, and assessment (Konner 2010; Widiger and Mullins-Sweatt 2005). I believe that the main obstacle to progress in this general area of human knowledge is the temptation for reductionism in the development of theoretical frames that then influence the development of corresponding approaches and instruments to the study of personality. For example, the psychoanalytic studies of personality constellations in the clinical practice of psychoanalytic investigation have permitted the description of major personality disorders such as the narcissistic personality disorders (Akhtar 1992) and have provided major advances into the description of the constellation of features characterizing the entire field of personality disorders. At the same time, however, the neglect of neurobiological determinants of motivational systems and intentional states, and of the environmental determinants of personality features, has made any efforts to construct a satisfactory, purely psychoanalytically informed theory of personality and personality disorders clearly inadequate. By the same token, reducing personality studies to the descriptive mapping of personality traits and factor analysis of clusters of epidemiologically predominant characterological traits neglects deeper structures of organization of behavior, and would seem to be equally inadequate (Kernberg and Caligor 2012b). This is reflected in the problematic efforts to relate such a trait psychology to specific neurobiological structures and functions, without considering the complexity of the internal psychological organization of behavior that gives the same traits a completely different meaning in the context of different underlying structural dynamics. A simplistic model of traits determined by neurobiological features reflecting specific genetic determinants seems as inadequate as a simplistic psychodynamic model based on unconscious conflict constellations. The same criticism, I believe, could be directed at other theoretical approaches regarding personality that neglect the complexity of the neurobiological and intrapsychic structures involved, such as a simplistic model of normal or pathological psychosocial adaptation. What follows is an effort to approach the organizational structure of the personality from multiple viewpoints that corresponds to the collaborative work of the Personality Disorders Institute at Weill Cornell Medical College over the past 30 years. The main findings of this group, with respect to identity and identity disturbances (disorders of the self), have now been incorporated in the classification of personality disorders of DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association 2013). The foregoing is not intended to be an all-inclusive understanding of personality formation, but, rather, an approach that attempts to do justice to the various fundamental scientific developments now available for our evolving understanding of this field. Our fundamental proposal considers personality as an umbrella organization that includes a small number of major component systems: temperament, object relations, character, identity, ethical value systems, and cognitive capability (intelligence). I consider temperament as the fundamental constitutive structure of the personality, represented by the general psychological reactivity of the individual, particularly psychomotor, cognitive, and affective reactivity (Kernberg 1992; Panksepp 1998). Affective reactivity is the fundamental aspect of a person’s psychic operation, constituting the primary motivational system, relating the individual to the environment in terms of positive, rewarding or negative, aversive affect states reflected, particularly, in peak affect state activation. Neurobiological affective systems are activated in response to organismic requirements that trigger alternative or combined activation of some of these systems. I am referring, particularly, to the attachment-separation panic system, the fight-flight system, the play-bonding system, the erotic system, the feeding system, and the agentic panic system (Panksepp 1998; Wright and Panksepp 2012). Each of these systems’ response to organismic needs of the individual is constituted by a combined activation of specific brain structures and neurotransmitters, particularly specific neuropeptide and neuroamine affective neurotransmitters, the serotonergic, dopaminergic, and noradrenergic systems. Of central relevance in early development is the attachment-separation panic system. It motivates the baby’s search for mother’s breast and mother’s bodily contact and represents the prototype of the establishment of relations with significant others (“object relations”). This system determines the establishment of internalized representations of these interactions with mother in the form of dyadic, affective memory units constituted by representations of self and representations of the “object,” within the context of a dominant positive or negative primary affect. These internalized affective memory traces constitute the building blocks of internal representation of relationships with significant others (Kernberg 1976). The repetitive activation of both extremely pleasurable and extremely unpleasurable, and potentially traumatic, affective experiences determines the primary motivation toward or away from an object. Within contemporary attachment theory, these motivational structures constitute internal models of behavior. Within psychoanalytic theory, these primary “ideal” and “all bad” internalized object relations will become organized around mutually dissociated major segments of either “idealized” or feared (persecutory) earliest experiences. Out of these internalized representations of relations with significant others—internal models of behavior—will derive habitual behavior patterns that, in their dynamic integration, eventually will constitute character. Thus, character is the dynamically integrated structure of habitual behavior patterns. At the same time, in the gradual consolidation of all the integrated representations of self, surrounded, so to speak, by an integrated set of representations of significant others, ego identity—or rather, self-identity—crystallizes as the overall integrated view of oneself and the nature of one’s habitual relations with significant others. In summary, so far, all these processes might be subsumed under the statement that temperament reflects the motivation for activation of interpersonal behavior, and the resulting internalized object relations will determine the development of character and identity: character as the objective, individualized integration of habitual behavior patterns, and identity as the subjective correspondent of character. Identity and character are mutually complementary expressions of the organization of psychic life. Character traits, the behavioral expression of the internal models of behavior derived from internalized self and object representation units, express the reflection of past experience on present, mostly automatized functioning modes of reaction. These traits depend in varying degrees on temperamental predispositions that influence past affective gratification or frustration of the person’s own needs and desires in the context of adaptive relations with significant others. In addition, character traits may represent protective reactions against the expression of deeper needs felt to be risky or unacceptable in the interpersonal field. In other words, character traits may serve a defensive purpose, sometimes directed against opposite impulses to the behavior expressed in the character trait. For example, habitual timidity may be an expression of a defensive reaction against projected aggressive trends, the projection onto others of intense negative affective experiences that are considered too risky to express in the environment. But timidity, to stay with this example, may also express a defensive reaction against exhibitionistic impulses expressing erotic wishes that, equally, cannot be tolerated consciously. In general terms, character traits may serve defensive purposes against intolerable primitive aggressive and erotic impulses linked to early infantile and childhood experiences that can no longer be freely expressed in later developmental stages of the personality (Kernberg and Caligor 2005). Defensive character traits are characterized by their rigidity—that is, by their habitual activation, whether they are adaptively indicated at a certain point or not—leading to rigidification of the personality, which is characteristic in many personality disorders. They may signal inhibition within certain areas of affective expression, typically of a sexual or aggressive origin, or else, in a paradoxical mode, reactions against feared instinctual impulses may lead to exaggerated counterphobic behaviors. In short, defensive character traits may be inhibitory, exaggerated, or “reaction formations,” and, particularly in the case of severe personality disorder, a combination of inhibitory and reactive formations that conveys a chaotic nature to the character structure, which is typical for these disorders. As mentioned earlier, some traits may reflect nonconflictual, dominant temperamentally based dispositions, particularly introversion or extraversion. Character traits may reflect vicissitudes of the major neurotransmitters that influence the activation of primary affective systems, such as the accentuation of intensity of negative affects derived from decrease in the functioning of the serotonergic system, and genetically determined hyperreactivity of the amygdala to aversive perceptions. To this point, I have related character traits to the behavioral activation of internalized models of behavior represented by dyadic units of self and object representations under the dominance of certain affects, particularly peak affect states. However, significant learning, of course, gradually occurs more and more under conditions of low affect states, when direct perception and cognitive elaboration of the perceived environment permit cognitive learning relatively uninfluenced by the expression of organismic needs reflected in affect activation. Character formation, in other words, does not depend exclusively on peak affect states. Basic affective states, however, correspond to basic motivational tendencies that, in turn, are ultimately activated by the basic neurobiological systems geared to express the instinctual needs related to attachment, feeding, self-protection, peer bonding, and sexuality. So far, I have referred to dyadic relations between self and object representations. It needs to be added at this point that from the beginning of life and gradually in a more articulated way, triadic internalized object relations complicate the original dyadic structures and determine more complex mechanisms of identity formation. As a child learns to accept and understand the relationship between the caretaking person and other significant adults and siblings in his or her psychosocial environment, the child begins to evaluate interactions between significant others and to relate them, by projection, to his or her own experiences in dyadic relations. Internalized dyadic relations now become influenced by the awareness of dyadic relations in the individual’s immediate environment, usually the relationship of the parents. In other words, triangulations emerge, leading to the significant conflicts around infantile aggression, sexuality, and dependency described in psychoanalytic developmental theory, and are of interest here because such triadic relations contribute to more realistic assessment of the self and of significant others in the interpersonal and internalized world of object relations. These developments foster the emergence of idealized, as opposed to realistic, representations of self, modeled by parental demands and prohibitions, praise, and criticism. A “moralistic” assessment of one’s self—with dismantling of primitive illusions of one’s own absolute goodness, power, and righteousness and a gradual internalization of expectations, demands, and prohibitions—evolves that creates tension between one’s desired sense of self and the realistically perceived one. The psychological structuralization of this tension represents the origin of the superego in psychoanalytic theory (Jacobson 1964). As previously mentioned, the subjective aspect of the dynamic organization of character is the development of identity. A major developmental process extends from the first 2–3 years of life to crucial developments during late childhood and then again in adolescence. I am referring to the gradual integration of the representations of the self into a durable self-concept, and the gradual integration of multiple representations of significant others as whole, separate objects. This developmental process facilitates the capacity for awareness, concern, and empathy for others. An early stage of development in which rewarding, pleasurable peak affect states and their corresponding internalized object relationships are completely separated, dissociated, or split off from negative, aversive peak affect states with early caretakers leads to the consolidation of two separate segments of psychic experience, one an ideal or idealized view of intrapsychic and external reality, and the other a frightening, threatening, potentially destructive, and catastrophic world of experience. This latter segment of psychic experience, by means of projective mechanisms, is mostly projected outside and expressed as a diffuse panic, eventually originating the construction of a fantastic, primitive, persecutory external world. These two segments of psychic experience originally represent the parallel buildup of idealized and persecutory dyadic units, linked to the separate channeling and corresponding cognitive-affective memory built up from the respective self representation–object representation units. Later, primitive psychological mechanisms of protection against overwhelming fears may lead to the defensive maintenance of this split organization, resulting in a character structure that relies upon the primitive defenses of splitting, projective identification, denial, primitive idealization, devaluation, and omnipotent control, as described by Melanie Klein (1946/1952, 1957) and her school. These primitive defensive operations can be observed clinically in the interpersonal behaviors of patients with severe personality disorders; under certain experimental situations, such as completely unstructured small and large study groups; and under extremely traumatic social circumstances. Under normal circumstances, however, when the strong predominance of positive experiences permits the development of basic trust in a loving and reliable world of object relations, this experience and the gradual predominance of a low affect activation learning environment facilitate the linking between positive and negative, idealized and persecutory representations of self and others. The predominance of positive experiences permits the absorption, integration, and mentalization of the negative segment of experience. Usually between the third and the fifth or sixth year of life, an integrated view of self is consolidated in the context of a more realistic, integrated view of significant others: this constitutes normal identity (Kernberg and Caligor 2012a). The failure of this process constitutes the syndrome of identity diffusion. Here a permanent splitting of the idealized and persecutory realm of experience is established, interfering with the integration of the concept of the self and of significant others. The syndrome of identity diffusion is reflected clinically in a patient’s incapacity to convey to an observer a coherent, integrated description of self and significant others in his or her life (Kernberg and Caligor 2012a). This incapacity is reflected psychopathologically in chaotic behavior patterns, severe feelings of insecurity, rapidly fluctuating self-assessments and degrees of self-regard, and uncertainty about one’s major interests and commitments. By the same token, these patients present great difficulties in commitment to work or profession, and in commitment to intimate mature relations in which sex and love need not be split off from each other. These patients have unstable and chaotic interpersonal relationships with significant others because of a severe lack of capacity to assess others in depth and rapid internal shifts of perception of self and others. It is this structurally fixated lack of integration of the self and of the representations of significant others that represents the main etiological features of character traits of the various prototypes of severe personality disorders. We have designated these patients as presenting borderline personality organization. In contrast, neurotic personality organization refers to those personality disorders that, although still presenting significant rigid, defensive, pathological character traits, do not present the syndrome of identity diffusion. This type of personality organization, therefore, represents a less severe level of personality disorder. From this general perspective, the proposal in the DSM-5 classification of personality disorders of identity pathology as the central criterion of severity of personality disorders, defined by the combination of lack of integration of the self and of the self’s willful self-determination, and by abnormal relations with others characterized by a lack of capacity for empathy and intimacy, clearly corresponds to the syndrome of identity diffusion (Kernberg and Caligor 2012a). Having explored the constituent components of the personality represented by temperament, character formation, and identity, I now return to the establishment of an internalized “moral” structure as reflected by a commitment to ethical values and to universally accepted ethical principles of relationships with significant others and in social life in general. Such value systems and ethical commitments are in contrast to, and transcend, the practical requirements of direct interactions with the surrounding human society. This component of the personality corresponds roughly to the Freudian superego. By the same token, the Freudian id, or dynamic unconscious, corresponds to the totality of primitive aggressive, sexual, and dependent longings and their corresponding desired and feared primitive object relations that cannot be accepted in consciousness as ego identity consolidates. Active rejection of such intolerable desires and fears tends to eliminate them from consciousness by means of repression and other advanced defensive operations that depend on the very establishment of ego identity. The Freudian ego, from the viewpoint of the organization of the personality, is centered on the functions of identity—that is, it is constituted by an integrated self and its surrounding world of internalized, integrated object representations. In other words, the self and its internal world of object relations govern, in the end, the organization of character traits that permit the harmonious activation of effective, intimate, empathic, and stable relations with significant others. The superego is a complex structure, the pathology of which is an important indicator of the severity—and the psychotherapeutic prognosis—of personality disorders. From the point of view of the corresponding internalization of ethical value systems, the work of Edith Jacobson (1964), it seems to me, has clarified the developmental stages of the establishment of this segment of the personality. What follows is a brief summary of her overall conclusions. The earliest precursor of the superego, in Jacobson’s (1964) proposal, is the internalization of the earliest prohibitions in the parent–child interactions, signaled by mother’s clear and parental “no!,” which is usually a response to the baby’s behavior that may constitute an active danger for him or her (at least in mother’s view). The fantastic distortions of such early prohibitions under the activation of negative peak affect states belonging to the persecutory segment of early experience derive from the combination of projective mechanisms and external frustrations. The prohibitions are amplified in terms of the baby’s misunderstanding and misinterpretations of them under the effects of such projective mechanisms. The internalization of this first, negative layer of internalized prohibitions stimulates primitive, implicitly life-threatening fantasied dangers and punishments, mostly centering around threatened abandonment under the effect of the activation of the attachment-separation panic system. The internalization of these prohibitions implies an acceptance of them as a protective mechanism against greater threats of abandonment and even annihilation. Obviously, under conditions of severe traumatic circumstances, physical abuse, sexual abuse, or chronic witnessing of physical or sexual abuse, such an early negative internalized sense of basic threats to survival may become much more dominant than would be the case under ordinary circumstances. This first, most primitive level of internalized prohibitions begins to influence both positive and negative segments of early experience, and is gradually followed by a second level of experiences, under the activation of positive peak affect states and, in part, under conditions of low affect activation, reflecting the environmental demands for “good” behavior. The expression of appreciation of the child’s behavior—its stimulation, rewards, and gratitude on the part of the parental objects—fosters behaviors that the baby comes to see as ideal in terms of the rewards associated with them. This layer constitutes the early ego ideal. It is constituted both by the internalization of the demanding and rewarding aspects of the ideally perceived images of the significant others and as a result of the development of more realistic “ideal” self representations under conditions of the gradual toning down and integration of the idealized and persecutory segments of the self. The buildup of the ego ideal as an internalized structure reinforces a sense of security, inner goodness, and warm connection with significant others. This structure gradually tends to neutralize the most primitive, persecutory segment of experiences within the superego. Throughout the second and third year of life, a process of integration between the most primitive persecutory and the secondary idealized level of realistic and fantasied, desired, and feared demands and prohibitions takes place. This neutralization of negative experiences tends to reduce projective processes and facilitates the internalization of yet a third level of demands and prohibitions. This is what Freud described as the advanced oedipal state of development, which is consolidated approximately between the fourth and sixth year of life (Freud 1923/1961). This third, more realistic level of internalized demands and prohibitions already contains many expectations derived from the family, reflecting the cultural expectations of the immediate social environment and their specific ethnic, social, national, religious, or racial traditions and biases. By the beginning of the school years (the latency years in traditional psychoanalytic theory), sufficient integration of these levels of internalized value systems, under the dominance of the third, more realistic and complex one, has taken place to permit the child to enter a socially shared value system. This system regulates behavior in terms of justice and concern for others as well as responsibility for one’s own behavior. Throughout the years leading to adolescence, a gradual process of depersonification, abstraction, and individualization of the superego takes place. In other words, an abstraction/general integration of value systems is no longer linked concretely to demands or prohibitions from any particular parental image (Jacobson 1964). Now, both deep, unconscious dispositions from the early childhood years—as well as later preconscious and conscious identifications with value systems acquired at home, school, and one’s social group—characterize the pubescent child. Finally, in early adolescence, with the activation of intense sexual strivings that reactivate, deepen, and expand sexual impulses, fantasies, fears, and desires from early childhood, and the impact of the development of secondary sexual characteristics, a profound transformation takes place. Now infantile prohibitions against sexuality and aggression have to be somewhat modified to conform with the more adult demands of intimate relationships under the combined impact of instinctual desires, efforts to harmonize them with the adolescent’s identity and character formation, and the conscious and unconscious value systems reflected by the developed, integrated superego. In short, the development of an internalized set of ethical principles derives from particular aspects of internalized object relations, namely, those in which different levels of a broad spectrum of demands and prohibitions initiate the child’s identification with the moral and ethical values of his or her home and social environment. Under pathological circumstances, different levels of severity of personality disorders may affect the integration of this internalized system of ethical values and, in turn, influence the development of different levels of psychopathology. Identity diffusion may become fixed under the dominance of severe aggressive impulses, whether derived from genetically determined, temperamentally established predominance of negative affects and lack of cognitive control and contextualization of affects, or severely pathological attachment experiences, or a traumatic early infancy and childhood. The lack of identity integration negatively influences the integration of the different layers of the superego system. The first, persecutory superego level becomes excessively dominant by aggressive internalized object relations; the relative weakness of the ego ideal level interferes with the integration of these two levels and brings about a persistent dominance of the first, persecutory superego level. The establishment of the third, higher level of ethical values suffers as well, a consequence of excessive projection of the negative earlier superego features. Clinically, this predisposes the person to the activation of ego-syntonic aggressive antisocial behavior. In fact, the development of antisocial behavior is the most important complication of the most severe level of borderline personality organization and signifies a poor prognosis for psychotherapeutic treatments. It causes damage to the capacity for relationships with others and to the normal modulation of affective expression of one’s own emotional needs. In contrast, under conditions when normal identity development proceeds adequately, this positively influences superego integration. Under circumstances when normal superego integration takes place, but with a strong induction of excessive guilt feelings over instinctual impulses, the early superego level may “contaminate” the ego ideal with the development of sadistic demands for perfection. Under these circumstances, the prohibitions against infantile sexuality during the development of the third level of superego development may appear as excessively prohibitive, even violent, so that an integrated but sadistic superego may inhibit sexual, aggressive, and dependent impulses, leading to a defensive character structure that characterizes the higher level of personality disorders (neurotic personality organization). One may summarize, in a simplified way, the dominant etiological features of personality disorders at different levels of severity in stating that at the level of borderline personality organization, conflicts (whatever their origin) around aggressive impulses predominate. At a higher level of development, with the establishment of normal identity, conflicts around infantile sexuality and dependency are predominant in the pathology of neurotic personality organization (Kernberg and Caligor 2012a). Obviously, this is a very general statement that includes a broad spectrum of variations in terms of individual history and development. The final major component of the personality is the cognitive potential of the individual, intelligence, particularly expressed in the achieved level of abstraction. It is generally agreed that intelligence level is dependent both on genetic disposition and on early experiences. The stimulation of cognitive processes and linguistic development, and the explicit attention to a child’s motivations, thought processes, and fantasy development, exert a fundamental influence on the development of cognitive ability. In general, a high cognitive potential facilitates an ever more realistic and subtle perception of the environment and the capacity to respond adequately to cognitive cues. The genetically determined development of the prefrontal and preorbital cortex, the anterior cortical midline structures, and the linguistic brain centers powerfully influences effortful control and participates in modulating affective response (Silbersweig et al. 2007). In that regard, cognitive control may mitigate the effects of a severely traumatic environment, although under severely pathological circumstances, intelligence even may amplify trauma by the development of complex distorted cognitive interpretations of a threatening environment. Conversely, cognitive systems of rationalization of pathological character traits may powerfully reinforce faulty adaptive strategies that may be encountered in severe personality disorders. In clinical practice, we find patients with very high intelligence and patients with very low intelligence at all levels of severity of personality disorders. Intelligence has a positive prognostic implication for the indication of psychotherapeutic treatments and, of course, for the general level of social adaptation in terms of educational development and level of work or profession. From the viewpoint of both the development of the normal personality and the etiology of personality disorders, we may distinguish two general organizational levels of psychic life: first, a neurobiological level of development that determines the organization of basic neurobiological structures that find expression in psychological life, particularly the development of perception and memory, the activation of consciousness, and, fundamentally, the development of affect systems that protect homeostasis and become the primary motivator of object relations. To this basic level of psychic development has to be added a second level of organization at a purely symbolic, intrapsychic level, which is best formulated in terms of the gradual building up of an internal world centered around personal identity and the realistic perception and investment in a world of significant others. This internal world organizes the satisfactory expression of basic instinctual needs, autonomy, and self-affirmation, and, by the same token, gratifying and effective relations with the surrounding social world. This includes sexual and romantic intimacy, friendship and commitments, and effectiveness and gratification in work and personal creativity. The limitations in this development represented by personality disorders are now within the realm of our understanding regarding etiology, mechanisms of interactions and organization, and the potential for treatment, as well as the present limitations of our therapeutic endeavors. Further progress in all these areas requires the attention to these two systems, the neurobiological and the intrapsychic, and their mutual influences in normality, pathology, and treatment. Akhtar S: Broken Structures: Severe Personality Disorders and Their Treatment. Northvale, NJ, Jason Aronson, 1992 American Psychiatric Association: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th Edition. Arlington, VA, American Psychiatric Association, 2013 Freud S: The ego and the id (1923), in Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol 19.Translated and edited by Strachey J. London, Hogarth Press, 1961, pp 12–66 Jacobson E: The Self and the Object World. New York, International Universities Press, 1964 Kernberg OF: Object Relations Theory and Clinical Psychoanalysis. New York, Jason Aronson, l976 Kernberg OF: Aggression in Personality Disorders and Perversion. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1992 Kernberg OF, Caligor E: A psychoanalytic theory of personality disorders, in Major Theories of Personality Disorders, 2nd Edition. Edited by Clarkin JF, Lenzenweger MF. New York, Guilford, 2005, pp 114–156 Kernberg OF, Caligor E: Identity: recent findings and clinical implications, in The Inseparable Nature of Love and Aggression: Clinical and Theoretical Perspectives. Washington, DC, American Psychiatric Publishing, 2012a, pp 3–30 Kernberg OF, Caligor E: Overview and critique of the classification of personality disorders proposed for DSM-V. Swiss Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry 163(7):234–238, 2012b Klein M: Notes on some schizoid mechanisms (1946), in Developments in Psycho-Analysis. Edited by Riviere J. London, Hogarth Press, 1952, pp 292–320 Klein M: Envy and Gratitude. New York, Basic Books, 1957 Konner M: The Evolution of Childhood: Relationships, Emotions, Mind. Cambridge, MA, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010 Panksepp J: Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions. New York, Oxford University Press, 1998 Posner MI, Rothbart MK, Vizueta N, et al: An approach to the psychobiology of personality disorders. Dev Psychopathol 15(4):1093–1106, 2003 14984139 Silbersweig D, Clarkin JF, Goldstein M, et al: Failure of frontolimbic inhibitory function in the context of negative emotion in borderline personality disorder. Am J Psychiatry 164(12):1832–1841, 2007 18056238 Widiger TA, Mullins-Sweatt SN: Categorical and dimensional models of personality disorders, in The American Psychiatric Publishing Textbook of Personality Disorders. Edited by Oldham JM, Skodol AE, Bender DS. Washington, DC, American Psychiatric Publishing, 2005, pp 35–56 Wright JS, Panksepp J: An evolutionary framework to understand foraging, wanting, and desire: the neuropsychology of the SEEKING System. Neuropsychoanalysis 14(10):5–39, 2012 ___________
CHAPTER 1
What Is Personality?
The Components of the Personality
TEMPERAMENT
CHARACTER AND EGO IDENTITY
NORMAL IDENTITY AND IDENTITY DIFFUSION
AN INTEGRATED SYSTEM OF ETHICAL VALUES (SUPEREGO)
INTELLIGENCE
References
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What Is Personality?
