Gentlemen!

In an earlier lecture we took frequent repetition to be the basis of the ‘overvalued idea’ [Ed] and, following from this, we even considered deliberate practice of certain trains of thought, a process which we must accept to have greatest influence in individual education, and for which the succinct expression ‘channeling’ [W] has recently been used. We need to make this concept more robust, insofar as channeling generally goes hand in hand with Affective coloration of the overvalued idea. Professional activities are particularly likely to generate overvaluation of certain ideas; their Affective coloration is an expression of the fact that a person’s overwhelming interest is normally directed towards his professional activity. We then observe the extraordinary fact that sensitivity to certain very specific sensory perceptions is thereby heightened in a remarkable way. Choosing examples closest to hand, an experienced alienist is immediately aware during his rounds of the institution, of any disruption and neglect of clinical services; his attention and interest are directed to the matter in question without need for any conscious effort; in any professional capacity, what we call ‘vigilance’ [W] has just such a basis. Likewise, a visual artist quite automatically notices shapes; the tailor eyes up peoples’ suits; the cobbler the shoes; and unmarried women observe the ring on a man’s finger. Here, the increased arousal produced by certain sensory stimuli seems to depend on the increased value ascribed to particular complex mental processes. Under specific circumstances, when the attention of a Newton turns to such an everyday event as an apple falling from a tree, this is likewise no coincidence but is based on the increased interest shown to processes which were hitherto of no concern, as a consequence of ideas currently in ascendance. It is the same with all experiences and discoveries, insofar as they are linked to everyday observations. Just how selective this facility can be, for noticing specific sensory impressions as a result of the dominance of certain ideas and their Affective coloration, is shown by the example of the mother, who, in deep sleep, ignores every other sound, but awakens instantly at the slightest sound from the child. We will call this selective process intrapsychic hypermetamorphosis [Ed]. We can now consider that such Affective coloration, and therefore the distinct overvaluation of ideas, is the most common basis for illusions.

The theory of illusions is based largely on experiences in the visual sense. The most familiar examples are the interpretation of vague, imprecise, and visual impressions as angst-ridden fantastic sensations, for instance a distant tree stump as a robber and fluttering laundry as a ghost. Evidently these are deliria of judgment, that is, clouding of judgment by Affects, such as fear or anxiety. Pragmatically we should distinguish firstly between two cases: clear versus indistinct sensory perceptions. Clouding of judgment in the latter case occurs as in the examples of visual illusions just given, and you can then take the Affective state to be the origin of the illusion. However, the question is as follows: By what process does Affect produce this influence? As we have seen we must attribute to Affective states the capacity to alter the normal value of ideas, in such a way that certain ideas are overvalued, while others, by comparison, are undervalued. In turn, overvalued ideas can be excited from the periphery more easily, and undervalued ones less easily than normal. Overvaluation of Affective concepts—a robber and a ghost in our example—therefore produces an abnormal facilitation of secondary identification, while undervaluation of remembered images in other sensory domains, or even in the same one, complicates any correction.

Now, that Affects can also take on different natures; or all manner of individualized processes of association can lead to overvaluation of ideas, which has precisely the same effect. I know the example of a young married man on a business trip in a foreign city, who made acquaintance with an easygoing woman, and visited a pleasure garden with her. Then he remembered that his wife had relatives in the same city; and that, by coincidence—as a less likely but still possible scenario—she might spontaneously decide to visit them, with the result that she might be in the same city, even conceivably at the same location. He looked around the people present, and was quickly so firmly convinced that a woman sitting in the distance was his wife that he did not dare convince himself of the truth of his belief by going closer, but preferred to get away from the place. I hardly know a better example to illustrate so succinctly the basic influence of individual, Affect-laden, coloured—and thus overvalued—perceptions for secondary identification in a normal person. Let us imagine the Affect level increasing by only a small amount, and thus clouding a person’s discretion. This is an emotional state that we can assume without further ado, in many new patients brought to the clinic against their will; and a series of illusions, that we see frequently in such situations, then become completely understandable. Here, the obviously overvalued ideas are the fact of the patient’s separation from his family, and pressures applied along with his becoming an inpatient. It is then not surprising that distant people, not clearly seen, are perceived as relatives; the doctor, as a prosecutor; and the clinic, as a prison. Such illusions are common in many acute mental illnesses. They are usually transitory in nature and easily corrected. In very severe cases, a degree of stupefaction and manifest inattentiveness may also occur, so that inaccurate sensory perception is replaced by a defective state of the sensorium. Then, so long as this situation holds, numerous other such illusions may arise which have in common that they change their content, depending on the usual rapid change of overvalued perceptions. States of delirium of most diverse origins provide common examples of this. It is no coincidence that the person with alcoholic delirium believes himself to be among his fellows, either in the tavern, or in his daily employment; he believes he recognizes in the doctor his haulage boss or his drinking companions: Such illusions match his overvalued perceptions. In such circumstances a good patriot probably considers the head warder to be the Kaiser or, if delirium is coloured by anxiety, he imagines the executioner and prosecutor. Perceptual inaccuracy, which favours the occurrence of illusions, can be made use of, if it is available, just as long as the patient is left to his own resources and is obviously in this so-called twilight state. The same condition leads to corresponding illusions in states of hysterical or epileptic delirium, and in the so-called delirium of exhaustion, etc.