Gentlemen!

When a question from a particular field of knowledge is addressed to a person who is unfamiliar with that field he may find the very question incomprehensible. A fundamental principle applies here, which should surprise no one, about newly acquired perceptions: Understanding the question can be gained only on condition of pre-existing acquired perceptions. If we refer to processes currently playing out in consciousness as ‘mental activity’ [W] and activity triggered by the question as ‘registration’ [W], and the result of mental activity included in the answer as ‘execution’ [W], then, in the present case, mental activity remains incomplete because the individual cannot produce activity corresponding to ‘registration’ [W]. If we bear in mind that mental activity is, as a rule, connected to an external stimulus, that is, any sensation, then sensory perception in general depends on such stimulation. Sensory perception that has never occurred previously and therefore cannot produce the usual consequent mental activity remains not only misunderstood, but also very imprecisely perceived: This fact convinces anyone who concentrates on the sounds of a foreign language. Thus if perception itself is to be precise, it requires certain pre-existing ‘mental acquisitions’ [W]. Quite similar to these simple examples of mental activity is behaviour involving more complex thought processes, where registration is often merely casual sensory perception, which escapes our attention. Moreover, such complex thought processes usually take place along prescribed paths from which emerge relatively rare ideas that are truly new. Overall, mental activity shows itself to depend on a long history of acquiring ideas, and arranging them in special ways; that is, it usually means simply repetition of the same excitatory processes in the same order as have repeatedly taken place in the past.

What is the basis for the ‘order’ [W] prevailing in these perceptions, which is expressed in routine mental activity? As you may recall, we gave the name ‘association’ [W] to the network of perceptions; order prevailing in perceptions therefore allows us to unlock our cache of associations, which are roughly the same for all individuals. Our question can therefore be rephrased in the following way: In what way are such universally valid associations formed? In part, I build here on what was said earlier, and is already familiar to you. In speaking of consciousness of the outside world, I pointed out that the natural order and succession of things represented in our brain are, to some extent, a reflection, of what is present in the outside world. It is therefore legitimate to link phenomena found there, to those also found in our consciousness. Amongst those properties of things that we learn to be relatively constant and changeless are their relationship with other things, be they inanimate or animate, and, in particular, with our own person. The fact that water becomes ice when cooled, and becomes water vapour when heated, is an experience that we take as valid because of its constant occurrence. In our brain this is reflected by association between the perceptions of water, ice, and water vapour, and hot and cold, happening in a completely regular way. The cold sensation of the skin can then, by association, awaken the perception of water freezing. The association is somewhat more complicated when observation of a thermometer leads us to the same conclusion. Here, visual perception linked to the registration is learned, as well as its association with the other perceptions. Just as the simplest natural phenomena impose themselves in regular order so to speak, so it is for more complicated associations of perceptions that we learn from examples in our environment. Our innate drive to imitate is analogous to the compulsion with which natural phenomena impose themselves on our brains. From earliest years we are used to behaving always in the same way as others. For example a person learns, in the crudest sense, from the example of others, that you dig up crops, cook them, eat them, and thus satisfy hunger. Even this simple example suffices—the person plants crops now [Ed], with planting of crops itself as an objective, to satisfy hunger later [Ed]. This highly complex action is ultimately driven, after interpolation of a whole series of associations, by initial feelings of hunger. In the simplest condition, every activity is driven by similar examples from the environment. The environment in which the person grows up, or where he lives, therefore extends back to fill his consciousness with a whole series of perceptions in a very specific arrangement, and the more monotonous the flow of his life the more strongly and immutably is this arrangement of perceptions fixed, undisturbed by details of more complex living conditions. Collective consciousness requires that you should behave like everybody else, and may often still be effective when mental activity is totally dislocated as a result of mental illness; so the otherwise inaccessible—and always reluctant—mental patient adopts the examples of fellow patients. The entire institutional treatment of mentally-ill people is based on this principle. On the other hand, we can see how deeply this herd consciousness is ingrained in us too, when we participate in a group gathering, or any kind of mass demonstration, intending to remain passive, yet being dragged into the same feelings that inspire the crowd. Teaching by example is also effective in deaf mutes who have had no other instruction. If he has no other deficits, such a person may often be a useful member of society within a narrow walk of life.

However, the main way to acquire a particular order to one’s perceptions is through articulated speech. Through this medium all finer and more precise relationships are made with ease, not only among concepts of solid and fixed objects, but also between these and events or activities—the latter in chronological order—and, by subtle nuances, the status of the personality in question is recognized. For more complex associations, abstract concepts [W] become familiar to us mainly through language, and shorthand labels are found, so that we learn to use a whole series of perceptions; and just by using such abbreviations for various states of mind, everyone learns empirically about such things as love, hate, fear, anxiety, hope, sorrow, etc. In such terms we have at our disposal a whole series of experiences in summary form, comparable to our conceptualization of solid concrete objects. The syntax of language, and its logical structure, gradually leads and guides the run of our thoughts. At least it may distinguish the educated from the uneducated, in that the former can follow every logical nuance of expression.