Perspectival Knowing Karl Jaspers and Ronald N. Giere



Thomas Fuchs, Thiemo Breyer and Christoph Mundt (eds.)Karl Jaspers’ Philosophy and Psychopathology201410.1007/978-1-4614-8878-1_7
© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014


7. Perspectival Knowing Karl Jaspers and Ronald N. Giere



Osborne P. Wiggins  and Michael A. Schwartz 


(1)
University of Louisville, 40292 Louisville, KY, USA

(2)
Texas A&M Health Science Center College of Medicine, 78665 Round Rock, TX, USA

 



 

Osborne P. Wiggins (Corresponding author)



 

Michael A. Schwartz



Abstract

This essay has three aims. We wish to emphasize that (1) one of the main theses of Jaspers’ General Psychopathology is that our knowledge is limited to particular points of view within which alone evidence can be interpreted and assessed; (2) this early position of Jaspers (already present in the 1913 edition) has found indirect support recently in a carefully reasoned book by the prestigious philosopher of natural science, Ronald N. Giere, entitled Scientific Perspectivism (2006); and (3) Jaspers’ conviction regarding the perspectivalism of knowledge remained powerfully influential throughout all his thought, even in his later philosophy.


Keywords
JaspersGierePerspectivismPerspectivalPsychopathology



7.1 Jaspers’ Multiperspectivalism


A passage in the Introduction to the Eighth edition of the book clearly expresses Jaspers’ intention of his book (die Absicht meines Buches) (Jaspers 1965, p. 36) . In this passage Jaspers refers to and quotes a paragraph in the edition of 1913, the edition we celebrate in this volume. He writes:



I wrote in 1913 the meaning of my system of methodology: “Instead of forcing the whole domain into a system on the ground of a theory, we ought to seek to separate neatly the individual paths of research, points of view, and methods. Only in this manner can we bring to presentation the many-sidedness of psychopathology and allow this many-sidedness to stand forth clearly. Therefore, we can exclude neither theories nor in general any kind of point of view. Each image of the whole should be grasped, its meaning and its limits understood, and recognized in its legitimacy (Geltung). However, what prevails throughout (Umfassende) remains always investigative thinking. Only out of this thinking is each image of the whole legitimate, and legitimate only from one standpoint. Finally the methods and categories of investigation rule over and restrain (beherrschen) the images of the whole. Thus psychopathological investigations can be organized only according to the different methods and categories out of which the images of the whole arise.” (Jaspers 1965, p. 36 (translation ours), 1997, pp. 41–42)

The above passage—the statement of the basic intention of the first edition—shows Jaspers to be firmly dedicated to his perspectivalism, and we shall argue later that this perspectivalism, expanded and reconceived, will remain central to his later philosophizing.

The passage describes perspectives as limited methods and sets of concepts. No one perspective can possibly reveal the whole of psychopathological reality; each perspective discloses only a restricted set of aspects of reality. Thus each perspective provides only a one-sided and partial depiction of reality. Other “sides” and “parts” of reality can be revealed only through research guided by other perspectives. Some psychopathologists may think it embarrassing that the field is furnished with multiple perspectives rather than just one systematic and comprehensive theory on which all researchers and practitioners can agree. But not Jaspers. He almost celebrates the “many-sidedness” of the field. It should simply be kept vigilantly in mind that this many-sidedness of theories and methods comes pared with the one-sidedness of each separate theory and its method .

Not only psychopathology but also the entire field of psychology is confined to research projects occurring from a particular point of view. Each approach in psychology highlights its own characteristic concepts and disregards others. The three main schools of psychology to which Jaspers refers are association psychology, intentionalist psychology, and gestalt psychology. About them Jaspers writes:



The schools of thought which have developed one after the other (as the psychology of association, of intentional thought, or as gestalt-psychology) and which have all attacked each other, can in fact be brought together. We can make use of all of them, each one within its own limitations, as a means of describing phenomena and posing new questions for analysis. None of these psychologies can claim to explain everything or provide an all-embracing theory of psychic life as it really is. They fall down entirely as an explanation of the psyche, but show their value nonetheless if one employs them for a clear presentation of the relevant psychic facts. They cohere, they can be combined and do not have to contradict one another. (Jaspers 1965, p. 135, 1997, p. 161)

In this last sentence Jaspers has in mind that the methodological and conceptual differences of the various schools of psychology often clash with one another. He sees these clashes not as inevitable outcomes of the differences. Rather they occur only when one of these schools claims to explain the entire field of psychological phenomena. When several different schools populate a discipline like psychology, i.e., when a plurality of approaches prevails in a discipline, for one of them to claim total validity is for it to claim exclusive validity. As a consequence, polemical attacks and counterattacks by the different schools plague the discipline, and it, embarrassed and weakened by the irresolvable polemics, fails to advance. Hence Jaspers seeks to secure the path toward advancement in psychopathology by showing why claims to exclusivity and universality must give way to more modest claims to validity within the limits of a particular perspective .

As Jaspers asserts, the different perspectives, as long as they do not claim more for themselves than their particular point of view warrants, i.e., as long as they allow the others their own spheres of legitimacy, need not contradict one another: “They cohere.” Hence Jaspers’ perspectivalism, by insisting that different perspectives are only one approach to the psyche, creates a field of consistency in multiplicity. We wish to emphasize this feature of Jaspers’ perspectivalism because some present-day writers would argue that different perspectives often contradict others and thus cannot possibly be true. Indeed, some authors would assert that different perspectives are “incommensurable” with one another, that they depict “different worlds” (Giere 2006, pp. 82–84). Jaspers contends that, while different perspectives may initially present incompatible elements, what is valid in each can be made compatible with the others, thus preserving the formal-logical conditions of truth .

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Apr 6, 2017 | Posted by in PSYCHOLOGY | Comments Off on Perspectival Knowing Karl Jaspers and Ronald N. Giere

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