© Springer International Publishing AG 2017
Pascual Ángel Gargiulo and Humberto Luis Mesones-Arroyo (eds.)Psychiatry and Neuroscience Update – Vol. II10.1007/978-3-319-53126-7_33. The Relationship Between Philosophy and Neuroscience from Dan Zahavi’s Phenomenology of Mind
(1)
Universidad Católica San Pablo, Urb. Campiña Paisajista s/n, Quinta Vivanco, Barrio de San Lazaro, Arequipa, 04001, Perú
Abstract
The bridge between psychiatry and neuroscience is not the only one we have to build; it is also necessary to narrow the gap between neuroscience and philosophy. This does not imply reducing the latter to the former or vice versa, but rather linking the two without eliminating their individual characteristics. Taking that into account, Dan Zahavi’s phenomenology of mind can make a great contribution by presenting itself as a different option within philosophy of mind, which up until the last few years was dominated by the analytic tradition. In this chapter, I present Zahavi’s proposal in four steps. First, I clarify the term phenomenology. This choice is not accidental, because nowadays this concept is used by diverse traditions and with different meanings. Second, I make the fundamental distinction between first-person perspective—which corresponds to phenomenology—and third-person perspective—compatible with neuroscience. Third, I explain the methodological stages assumed by Zahavi from the Husserlian tradition. These stages enable him to study from the first-person perspective rigorously: epoché, phenomenological reduction, eidetic variation, and intersubjective verification. Finally, I develop the issue of naturalization of phenomenology in order to establish a dialogue between science and philosophy. For Zahavi that naturalization does not necessarily imply reductionism, but can be understood as something necessary for a fruitful exchange between those disciplines.
Keywords
Philosophy of mindPhenomenologyNeuroscienceDan ZahaviFirst-person perspectiveNaturalizationIntroduction
The bridge between psychiatry and neuroscience is not the only one that we have to build; it is also necessary to narrow the gap between neuroscience and philosophy. This does not imply reducing the latter to the former or vice versa, but rather linking the two without eliminating their individual characteristics. Taking that into account, the phenomenology of mind of Dan Zahavi (1967–) can make a great contribution by presenting itself as a different option within philosophy of mind, which until recently was dominated by the analytic tradition.
At present, the current of thought begun by Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) is gaining more space in this context thanks to three facts that favored its incorporation [1] (pp. 26–27): the growing interest within the philosophy of mind in the hard issue of the consciousness, the desire to develop a proposal of cognition that would be embodied, and the necessity of referring to the experience from neuroscientific studies.
All these questions necessarily imply a way of understanding the dialogue between philosophy and science, which in recent years has been specified in terms of the philosophy and neuroscience relationship, given the great advances in the latter discipline. The effort to link these areas is not new, but without doubt the context of philosophy of mind provides a more concrete space to pose the question from the philosophical perspective, since it has a look that is clearly interdisciplinary.
In broad terms, in philosophy of mind we find two broad tendencies with respect to the link between philosophy and neuroscience. On the one hand are those who insist on reducing the first to the second, as does Paul Churchland [2], or those who do not eliminate philosophy but reduce it to an area dedicated only to resolving semantic themes and not as a path that can offer knowledge about reality and human beings (for example, Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker [3]). On the other hand are those who think that it is possible to affirm the distinction of knowledge, with the peculiar characteristics that belong to both disciplines, and at the same time support the necessity of dialogue to advance knowledge. This second tendency is being developed in a variety of philosophic traditions: the analytic, where John Searle [4–8] can be considered (even with some difficulties [9, 10]); the thomistic, one of whose major exponents in the context of philosophy of mind is Juan José Sanguineti [11–19]; and the phenomenological, within which the proposal of Dan Zahavi is classified. He is a concrete example of how this philosophical line can intervene in fundamental themes for philosophy of mind, seeking an integration, without eliminating their own characteristics, between phenomenology and neuroscience, and simultaneously in dialogue with analytic philosophy.
In this chapter, I develop the relationship between phenomenology and neuroscience (and the positive science in general) based on his proposal. For this I explain, first, what the Danish philosopher understands by phenomenology. Second, I make the fundamental distinction between first-person perspective—which corresponds to phenomenology—and third-person perspective—compatible with neuroscience. Third, I explain the methodological stages assumed by Zahavi from the Husserlian tradition. These stages enable him to study from the first-person perspective rigorously: epoché, phenomenological reduction, eidetic variation, and intersubjective verification. Finally, I develop the issue of naturalization of phenomenology in order to establish a dialogue between science and philosophy.
Phenomenology as Explored by Dan Zahavi
To analyze the relationship between philosophy and neuroscience within the proposal of Zahavi, it is convenient to begin with a quick clarification of the term phenomenology. This choice is not accidental, because how the concept is considered determines how the relationship with positive science is established. Moreover, nowadays this notion is used by diverse traditions and with different meanings, often without considering the reference to the philosophical tradition that constituted it in a specific way of doing philosophy [20] (p. 76). Some speak of phenomenology as if it were synonymous with description, others as akin to subjective experience (understood as the view of each), and there are those who identify it with introspective method. Even within the phenomenological trend itself we find differences [21] in the way this concept is understood.
For Dan Zahavi [22], the concept of phenomenology refers to a philosophical tradition founded by Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), which includes different thinkers such as Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980), Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961), Michel Henry (1922–2002), and Edith Stein (1891–1942), among others. Without denying the particular nature of each of these philosophers, and the critiques that were made, Zahavi shows that in all of them there are some common assumptions that make it possible to speak of a specific philosophical tradition, such as the interest in subjectivity, intentionality, consciousness, and the self, among other things.
Because of the important representatives included in this current of thought, the influence it has had on so many others (such as Adorno, Gadamer, Habermas, Derrida, and Foucault), and the constant reference it has been in the dialogue between different traditions of the twentieth century (such as existentialism, hermeneutics, structuralism, deconstructionism, and post-structuralism), phenomenology “can be regarded as the cornerstone of what is often (but somewhat misleadingly) called ‘continental philosophy’” [23] (p. 68).
The name of this philosophy has to do with the fact that the interest is in the study of the phenomenon, that is, in what appears to the consciousness. Following Heidegger, Zahavi understands the phenomenon “as that which shows itself, as beings’ own manifestation” [22] (p. 675), or referring to Husserl “as the manifestation of the thing itself” [24] (p. 55). This leads him to consider phenomenology as “a philosophical analysis of the different modes of givenness, and in connection with this as a reflective investigation of those structures of understanding that permits different types of beings to show themselves as what they are” [22] (p. 675), [24] (p. 55).
This can lead to a false distinction between what appears (broadly defined) and reality as if they were two different things, as if the object were beyond the phenomenon or the phenomenon concealed the object. By contrast, Zahavi thinks that the phenomenon manifests the reality, is the reality as given—that, after all, is the only way we can know. Appearance is not the synonym of phenomenon, but is the object as it appears to a “superficial glance” [25] (p. 22); reality, instead, refers to the object but in the way that it can “appear in the best of circumstances” [25] (p. 22). Appearance and reality is “a distinction internal to the phenomenon” [25] (p. 22).
“If we wish to grasp the true nature of the object, we had better pay close attention to how it manifests and reveals itself, be it in sensuous perception or in scientific analyses” [23] (p. 55). As for the latter aspect, Zahavi—referring to Husserl—affirms that the objective of phenomenology “is not to obtain new empirical knowledge about different areas in the world, but rather to comprehend the basic relationship to the world that is presupposed in any such empirical investigation” [22] (p. 665). For him [26], this can lead to understand Husserl’s proposal as being aligned with internalism, which maintains that our access to the world is conditioned and is done through internal representations. In Zahavi’s interpretation, the link between consciousness and world is, rather, constitutive. Precisely, his interest in consciousness lies in the fact that consciousness reveals the world, because it is through it that reality is presented to the subject.
It is also important to note that for Zahavi, phenomenology “is basically […] a transcendental philosophical endeavor” [27] (p. 340) although different to the Kantian transcendental philosophy which, because of the distinction between phenomenon and noumeno, is unable to leave skepticism [22, 26] (p. 663, 680). As well as being a transcendental proposal, phenomenology is idealistic in that it “is committed to the view that the world is necessarily correlated to an intersubjective community of embodied subjects” [28] (p. 84).
Husserlian transcendental idealism can be understood as “anti-representationalist criticism of metaphysical realism” [26] (p. 364). The metaphysic realism which he opposes states that knowledge is a mere copy of a reality that exists independently of the knower. For Zahavi, this proposal pretends to study a world that would exist beyond the presentation to the consciousness, tries to access to the world in itself eliminating any subjective element. In this way, it would differ from the common conception of the world, where subjective and objective characteristics take place together. Here, it would seek a pure third-person perspective, as in the case of the scientific proposal which argues that the researcher could look at the reality “from nowhere” [28] (p. 85) to reflect the characteristics and classifications that already exist in nature.
According to Zahavi, a conception of this kind—which could be characterized as an attempt of a neutral knowledge of the reality—is impossible. There is no world in itself and others which appear, there exists only one real world that is given to consciousness. Thus for Husserl—as interpreted by Zahavi—the true realism is phenomenological idealism [24] (p. 70), [28] (p. 87).
What was said above does not mean that transcendental idealism can be identified with metaphysical idealism. The latter maintains that there is a metaphysical dependence of reality from the subject, misinterpreting the notion of absolute consciousness that Husserl proposes as being like a divine consciousness. In contrast, in the phenomenological proposal the existence of the real is not denied but asserts a “constitutive link between mind and world”, where reality is not a brut datum but “a system of validity and meaning” that calls for a subjectivity, “that is, experiential and conceptual perspectives” [28] (p. 80).
Despite taking away the metaphysical realism and idealism (so in some sense Husserl’s position could be characterized as beyond realism and idealism [24] (p. 72), [29]), Zahavi [28] shows that in the Husserlian proposal there is no opposition to metaphysics itself; on the contrary, phenomenology necessarily implies it. The opposition is to a certain metaphysics (as mentioned) which is not compatible with the phenomenological proposal.
To complete the characterization of phenomenology proposed by Zahavi, it is finally important to mention that in this current of thought there is a clear concern about the method—to which I will refer in this chapter—but without reducing their interests only to this. In addition, phenomenology proposes an understanding of reality as a whole with reference to the subject who knows it. In this sense it shares, in some respects, the object of study with the science, and this is one of the reasons why we should be open to dialogue with it, without renouncing our own characteristics. Phenomenology and neuroscience are disciplines that relate and differ. And to start this understanding accurately, I explain below how Zahavi understands the first-person perspective and the third-person perspective.
First-Person-Perspective and Third-Person-Perspective
Dan Zahavi makes the distinction between first-person perspective and third-person perspective as a way to explain the relationship between phenomenology and neuroscience. This terminology is also used by other philosophers and is a key to understand the theme of this chapter in the context of contemporary philosophy, but it does not have the same meaning for all thinkers.
Absolutism of the Third-Person-Perspective
In some philosophers, an opposition exists between the two perspectives which ends in favoring one of them: the third-person perspective. According to this approach, to understand the issue only an approximation of this type should be taken into account if we want to achieve objective knowledge. Therefore, only natural science—which uses this perspective—would be valuable, because it could provide a reliable and universal knowledge of reality. Here, the reality studied would be in front of the scientist and could be evaluated by anyone with full objectivity and transparency, avoiding the biases which are inherent in subjectivity. In contrast, the first-person perspective would be subjective, providing mere opinions; this would reveal only the particular state of each individual’s inability to achieve certain knowledge applicable to all individuals.
For Zahavi, this erroneous opposition between the two perspectives is based on another pair of false contrapositions corresponding to their objects of study. First, it states that the objects of sciences—corresponding to the third-person perspective—have nothing to do with the knowledge and everyday actions that are carried out without any rigorous reflection on the world of life—examined by the first-person-perspective [24] (p. 126). In addition to this, secondly, Zahavi argues that there is an opposition between primary sensitive qualities and secondary sensitive qualities [24] (p. 127). The third-person-perspective would put us in contact with the primary sensitive qualities (weight, size, shape, etc.), i.e., those aspects of reality that can be expressed quantitatively and would therefore be independent of the particularities of each knower subject. This would allow a universal, reliable, and objective knowledge. In contrast, the first-person perspective would provide access to the secondary sensitive qualities (such as color, taste, texture, etc.), i.e. features of the world that depend inherently on the specific subject who knows them, providing a biased knowledge of reality.
Although at first sight this would seem a reasonable position, nevertheless it is not entirely clear. As Gallagher and Zahavi [25] (p.18) say, the opposition between first- and third-person perspective can be misleading because the terms objective and subjective are ambiguous [25] (p. 19). This aspect was also highlighted in analytic philosophy by John Searle [7, 8], who demonstrates the difference of meanings by referring to the distinction between ontological subjectivity and objectivity and epistemic subjectivity and objectivity (although there are some differences, not less important, between the mode of understanding first-person perspective in the analytical tradition and phenomenology [1] (p. 51–52)).
Objectivity and Subjectivity
Because of the ambiguity of the terms, in one sense we can say that both perspectives are objective and subjective, but in another sense not. They are objective in that they both seek to avoid prejudices, limitations, and insights that may depend on the passing liking or feeling of the person who knows. That is, seek to understand some aspect of reality, including man, and that knowledge could be shared with others, i.e., it would be universal. In this sense, not only science seeks objectivity; phenomenology also has the same interest because it does not seek to provide a simple description of circumstantial facts or individual preferences, as when someone says he prefers coffee to tea, or summer to winter. Such inquiries are not on the horizon of phenomenological study.
On the other hand, the two perspectives are subjective in that they are an act of knowledge, and all knowledge is realized by a particular subject. The same designations indicate that we are talking about a perspective, and this can only be attributed to a subjectivity, because things cannot have a perspective on something; they are not those who know, but in all cases, the known. This implies that a pure third-person perspective, conceived as a cognitive act that has no influence of subjectivity, is illusory. As Zahavi says, “[t]here is no pure third-person perspective, just as there is no view from nowhere. To believe in the existence of such a pure third-person perspective is to succumb to an objectivist illusion” [25] (p. 40). Therefore, the third-person perspective always implies inevitably the experience of a particular subject.
If the two perspectives are objective and subjective in the sense explained above, they are not if one considers other meanings of these adjectives, which make it possible to differentiate these approaches. Without denying the above, we can say now that the third-person perspective is objective—and not subjective—in that it studies the reality heading straight to it and considers it as a thing, without seeking to scrutinize to what extent there is a subjective dimension present in that knowledge. And this is valid in two ways. First, in that when studying reality, this is conceived without considering how subjectivity affects that cognitive act, and second, in that when studying human beings we do not consider them as subjects, that is, we do not pay attention to their capacity of feeling, but know them as a substance that lacks subjectivity. Moreover, the first-person perspective is subjective—and not objective—mainly because in this approach the reality is considered as presented to consciousness, as experienced. As with any conscious act, knowledge has a subjective, experiential dimension that neuroscience with its own method cannot grasp. Only from a first-person perspective is it possible to know that dimension, and this aspect is unavoidable if one wants to properly understand what any conscious act is.
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