Associational Cortex And Memory



Associational Cortex And Memory





The processes we look at in this chapter are those that we humans tend to be inordinately proud of, and to which we owe any temporary biological success that we have managed to achieve. Many animals are more agile and better coordinated than we are, can hear better or see better, and nearly all of them have more sensitive noses. Our special virtue is that we are quite good at storing and processing such sensory information as gets through to us, so that we use it to respond more effectively to our environment. But this difference is quantitative, not qualitative: there is no very sharp distinction between us and other creatures in this respect. It is simply that the parts of their brains that carry out these functions in a rudimentary way have in us been very greatly expanded and developed, above all the cerebral cortex.


The organization of associational cortex

If we compare the cerebral hemispheres of a series of animals from different evolutionary stages, what is striking when we get to Man is not just the expansion in the absolute mass of neural tissue, but the dramatic changes in the relative proportions of the cortex devoted to different functions. Very little of a rat’s cortex is not either primary motor or a projection area for one of the senses; in Man, by contrast, most areas of the cortex neither respond in an obvious way to simple sensory stimulation, nor produce movements when electrically activated: they are what have sometimes been called silent areas. image




image




image

Now these are precisely the properties we would expect from neural levels in the middle of the model of the brain shown above, that was first presented in Chapter 1. Because a neuron in any level is activated only by a particular pattern of activity in the preceding layer, as we penetrate deeper into the sensory side we find that individual neurons become fussier and fussier about what they respond to, and eventually the chance of our finding out, in an experiment of finite duration, what they do actually do becomes vanishingly small. Stimulation is equally frustrating: unless we happen to stimulate them in a pattern that makes some kind of neural sense, corresponding to what is needed to activate the next layer along, nothing will happen at all. Both these problems are accentuated in cortical areas, where there is an immense degree of convergence and divergence from neurons in one column to those in others.

The third weapon in the neurophysiologist’s armoury, lesioning, is similarly blunted. Because these areas
integrate or associate information from diverse sources which cut across the conventional divisions of sensory modality (which is why the corresponding cortical areas are called association areas), the effects of lesions often lack the functional specificity found, for example, in damage to the primary visual or motor cortex: we are at a high hierarchical level, in the sense discussed in Chapter 9. Lesions can often lack spatial specificity as well, and there is little of the topological orderliness found at more peripheral levels. This situation is rather like what happens in a telephone exchange: at the periphery – the region where the incoming cables arrive – there is a systematic relationship between a subscriber’s number and the position of his particular connection, but the circuits in the heart of the exchange that set up the connections and form, in effect, associations between different subscribers, are shared by all of them and used to set up different circuits on different occasions, and therefore have no obvious spatial organization.




image

The analogy of the telephone exchange, introduced in Chapter 1, is a suggestive one. Just as an exchange is capable of connecting any subscriber to any other, so cortical convergence and divergence guarantees to provide a neural pathway from any sensory stimulus to any motor response, clearly a necessity for complete flexibility of behaviour. Similarly, the capacity of an exchange – the number of associations it can make at any one time – is simply proportional to the quantity of the common switching equipment it contains. Might the neural elements of associational cortex also be in some sense shared in this way? Such a notion, of associational cortex being uncommitted to any particular task, but providing a reserve of computing power that can be applied to whatever job is on hand, was originally suggested by the experiments of Karl Lashley described on p. 15 – Lashley’s extreme statement, his ‘Law of Mass Action’ – that the effect of lesions in associational cortex depends more on how large they are than on their exact location – is now less in favour. Recording from units in associational areas shows in many cases that they are ‘silent’ because we are using unnatural or boring stimuli; with adequate sensory patterning they can often be made to respond, in a way that may be complex and highly time-dependent, but does not alter radically from one experiment to the next. And it is clear from clinical observations in particular that discrete lesions in associational cortex can often lead to relatively specific functional defects, rather than something like a generalized loss of ‘intelligence’. What is true, as we shall see, is that these functional defects may be of the wide-ranging and subtle kind that is characteristic of damage at a high hierarchical level – for instance the loss of the ability to speak French, while spoken English is unimpaired – and also that there is little reproducibility from subject to subject, in the sense that a lesion in a particular place in one person may have a completely different effect in another person. Such nuanced deficits are not readily appreciated by the busy non-specialist clinician, for several reasons. First, the commonest cause of discrete cortical lesion is a cerebral infarct, usually as a result of occlusion of a large cerebral artery or even a carotid. Among the devastation wrought by such a large lesion – paralysis, hemianopia, aphasia, hemineglect – impaired performance of higher, more specialized areas is often obscured; recognition is made particularly difficult as patients often appear curiously unaware of their loss. Second, despite advances in our diagnostic techniques and our understanding of the pathogenesis of stroke, our ability to do much about it is frustratingly rudimentary and, certainly in the acute and early management of a stroke, any variation in the treatment administered is guided by the grossest of clinical signs, such as the presence of significant limb weakness or a marked visual deficit. Subtle difficulties with mental arithmetic or recognizing street names are not identified because they are not sought, and not sought because, at this stage, they have only a limited bearing on clinical management.

In addition, we shall see clear evidence that cortical neurons can change their function to help cope with a change in functional demand. Thus the idea of a completely uncommitted pool of ‘brain power’ – rather like the ‘cloud computing’ that enhances the capabilities of smartphones – is an over-simplification; at a given moment the neurons are specialized in their function, but at a high level in the hierarchy: it is this that gives lesions in associational cortex their subtle and unpredictable quality. Cortex might be described as a community of specialists, acting in concert through an astonishing communication network by which they can share their ideas.


Structure

In Chapter 4 (p. 83) we saw how the cerebral cortex can be parcelled up into the Brodmann areas on the basis of variations in the size and composition of its six layers. Conversely, it can be useful to group them together into larger functional units. In terms of gross anatomy, primate cortex is classically divided into four areas: frontal cortex (FCX) anterior to the central sulcus, temporal cortex (TCX) along the thumb of the cerebral boxing glove, occipital (OCX) at the back, and parietal (PCX) in between. In fact, the functional boundaries between PCX and OCX and TCX are not very distinct,
and many neurologists prefer to lump them all together as parieto-temporo-occipital cortex (PTO CX, or POT). What we are then left with is a binary division of cerebral cortex by the watershed of the central sulcus into just two areas, front and back. Just as in the spinal cord, where the ventral half is essentially motor and the dorsal half sensory, so – broadly speaking – everything anterior to the central sulcus is, in a deep sense, motor, everything behind it sensory. Furthermore, the posterior half is itself divided into an upper part concerned largely with localization and movement (the ‘where’ stream – see p. 158) and a lower part concerned with recognition (‘what’). image




image




image

Another classic way of dividing it up is into primary sensory and primary motor areas – and the rest. As we have seen, it is this remnant, association cortex, that has grown most in the course of evolution, particularly the frontal associational area. Nowadays, more of the associational cortex tends to get called secondary or tertiary cortex, for example the large number of secondary visual areas. This diagram shows human cerebral cortex in a highly stylized, topological form, based on contiguity. It demonstrates how these associational areas seem to form bridges between primary cortex devoted to different sensory modalities, and between primary sensory and primary motor cortex. image Right in the middle is the posterior parietal cortex (Brodmann areas 5, 7, 39 and 40), and one might therefore expect it to be concerned with the coordination of information from the visual, auditory, somatosensory and motor areas which surround them; and on the whole this seems to be true. There are massive fibre bundles connecting these neighbouring cortical regions with the parietal region, and it also receives a projection from the pulvinar and lateral posterior nuclei of the thalamus. The pulvinar in turn receives sensory information from visual areas 18 and 19, and from the colliculi and lateral and medial geniculate bodies; in addition it receives the usual reciprocal fibres from the parietal cortex itself. The lateral posterior nucleus obtains its input partly from the pulvinar and partly from the (somatosensory) ventral posterolateral thalamic nucleus. Efferents from parietal cortex go to the premotor and supplementary motor areas, to the frontal eye fields, to basal ganglia (and hence to colliculus) and indirectly to the cerebellum. In addition to connections between neighbouring areas, there are also bands of fibres (fasciculi) that link distant areas, and can be big enough to see easily with the naked eye in gross dissection. Meanwhile, the corpus callosum with its staggering 100 million fibres shuttles information backwards and forwards between the two hemispheres.




image




image

Hence, by receiving a range of sources of sensory information and enjoying reciprocal communication with motor planning and execution, posterior parietal cortex mediates bidirectional sensorimotor communication: the posterior parietal cortex is ideally placed to provide a working model of our environment which may then guide an appropriate motor response. Indeed, patients suffering vascular lesions to the posterior parietal cortex exhibit difficulty in tasks requiring sensory guided activity such as reaching for visually or somatosensorily presented objects, clinically manifesting as apraxia (see below, p. 263). On the other hand, receiving output reports from motor areas allows one to account for any motor
activity that might influence interpretation of the sensory data reaching the posterior parietal cortex – did I walk into the chair, or did the chair walk into me? Consistent with this idea, patients with posterior parietal lesions often suffer from tactile agnosia (discussed below, p. 261), the inability to recognize objects based on purely tactile information, a feat usually accomplished by interpreting the somatosensory consequences of manipulating an object. ‘Feeling’ is, after all, a very active process.


Neuronal responses

The responses of units in associational cortex show progressively more specific recognition of specialized features of the outside world, especially those that are behaviourally important such as hands and faces and eyes, compared with those of primary projection areas: some visual examples were noted in Chapter 7. In addition, as might be expected from such a diversity of input, neurons in PTO cortex often show complex responses to stimulation of more than one modality. The figure shows an example from such a neuron in the monkey, responding both to visual and somatosensory stimulation. Visually, it responds best to objects close to the eye, in one quadrant; it also responds to touching the skin in a corresponding quadrant near the orbit. Sometimes one observes responses when an animal expects a stimulus even though it is not present: in a sense the ‘near the eye’ unit could be thought of one that fires in response to a very near visual target because through experience it has come to expect contact to be made with the skin after visual stimulation.




image

Responses are also often greatly influenced by context and attention. For instance, many parietal units are visually driven, with receptive fields that can be mapped out; but unlike visual cells in visual cortex itself, they may or may not fire when a stimulus appears within the field, depending on whether or not the stimulus is sufficiently interesting to evoke a subsequent motor response such as an eye movement. For this reason, this area is better regarded as sensorimotor than purely sensory (if indeed such a distinction has much meaning).

A compelling example of the intimate association of ‘sensory’ and ‘motor’ areas is the coupling that has been shown between a region of the premotor area that is active in monkeys when doing precision grip with the fingers, and another area in parietal cortex that is visually driven, and only active when the monkey sees himself – or indeed another monkey or human – doing the same task. Recording from PMA, we find that even though it is a motor area, its neurons are more active when the monkey is looking at the same task being performed – even in a video – and conversely the sensory area is activated when the monkey carries out the task, even if it can’t in fact see it. image The functional importance of such ‘mirror neurons’, and their system of mutual association is twofold: partly to enable one to learn tasks by looking at them, but also to understand what someone else is doing when you see them doing something – prediction. All of this appears to be due to a rather precise set of fibre connections that links the two areas together – both ways – in a remarkably specific way. Presumably there are many such mutual systems of association forming hierarchical ladders of predictive links between stimulus and response, extending from the most basic, semi-reflex level (for instance, the links between primary somatosensory and primary motor cortex) up to the most subtle conceptual relationships, many stages removed.




image




image


Sep 8, 2016 | Posted by in NEUROLOGY | Comments Off on Associational Cortex And Memory

Full access? Get Clinical Tree

Get Clinical Tree app for offline access